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Abstract
It was the goal of the current study to investigate 
one debiasing technique and its ability to reduce 
judgmental errors. In addition, a rival hypothesis of 
demand characteristics was examined as a possible 
explanation of any findings of the reduction of judgmental 
errors. Participants were randomly assigned to either a 
control group or a debiasing group and asked to rate the 
likelihood of several hypothetical events i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X  
2 (Gender X Anxiety Group X Treatment Group X Repeated 
Measure) repeated measures experimental design. Level of 
anxiety responsiveness was measured to arrange subjects 
into a "normal" and a highly anxious group. It was 
hypothesized that highly anxious participants would report 
higher probability estimates of future threat-related 
events relative to participants with a "normal" level of 
anxiety responsiveness, a main effect for anxiety.
Secondly, it was hypothesized that a two-way interaction of 
treatment group and repeated measure upon threat 
probability ratings would be found. Third, it was 
hypothesized that a two-way interaction of gender and 
anxiety upon threat probability ratings would be found. 
Finally, it was hypothesized that there would be no main 
effects or interaction effects involving the repeated
iv
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measure and the experimental demand independent variable.
A mixed factorial design 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted using the threat probability ratings as 
the dependent variable. In addition, two separate analyses 
were conducted using the experimental demand stimuli as the 
dependent variable to investigate demand characteristics as 
an explanation of the debiasing. The results showed that 
the debiasing procedure was effective in the reduction of 
judgmental errors. In addition, it was found that demand 
characteristics could not account for the reduction in 
pessimistic threat-related predictions. The results were 
discussed in terms of cognitive biases and implications for 
cognitive behavior therapy.
v
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Introduction
The judgement of the likelihood of future events 
involves many processes other than the mental mathematical 
estimation of probabilities. Judgmental processes appear 
to involve the use of mental shortcuts, or heuristics. 
Heuristics function to aid in the estimation of the 
likelihood of future events in order to reduce the 
complexity of the estimation. As a result, errors in 
judgement can occur due to the reliance on these heuristics 
that reduce the need for complex calculations in favor of 
easily estimated judgements that are, at times, inaccurate.
One area of judgmental error that has received recent 
attention is the pessimistic prediction of future threat- 
related events associated with high levels of anxiety. 
Pessimistic errors in the estimation of the likelihood of 
future events have been found in anxious individuals (Bentz 
& Williamson, 1998; Bentz, Williamson, & Smith, 1999).
Most investigators have postulated that a process of 
increased availability of threat-related information leads 
to this judgmental bias (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Harvey, 
Richards, Dziadosz, & Swindell, 1993).
Research on the reduction of judgmental errors has 
attempted use techniques which increase the availability of 
alternative information (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Mumma & 
Wilson, 1995). However, the results are mixed in findings
1
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2of debiasing techniques that have attempted to reduce 
judgmental biases (Sharpe & Adair, 1993; Weinstein & Klien,
1995) . In addition, no previous studies have specifically- 
investigated the reduction of a pessimistic judgment bias 
associated with higher levels of anxiety.
It was the goal of this study to investigate one 
debiasing technique, the Consider-An-Alternative procedure 
(Hirt & Markman, 1995), and its ability to reduce the 
judgmental errors which have been shown to be associated 
with higher levels of anxiety (Bentz & Williamson, 1998).
In addition, the rival hypothesis of demand characteristics 
was investigated as a possible explanation of any findings 
of a reduction in judgmental errors.
Cognitive Biases in Anxiety
Cognitive biases have been postulated to be an 
important component in the development and maintenance of 
anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1997; Bower, 1981; Lang, 1985; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) . In addition, cognitive biases 
are important in our understanding of the mechanisms of 
debiasing. The current study will specifically address the 
debiasing of one type of cognitive bias, namely judgmental 
errors associated with anxiety.
Research on attentional biases, memory biases, and 
more recently, judgmental biases form the scientific basis 
for the understanding of how anxious persons develop
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3organized memory from the systematic selection of threat- 
related information. Each of these topics is discussed 
below. In addition, a conceptualization of cognitive 
biases is also reviewed, with an emphasis on cognitive 
models of anxiety.
Attentional Bias The attentional bias research has 
found that anxious persons allocate more attentional 
resources to threat-related stimuli. This research has 
established that anxiety is associated with the biased 
allocation of attention toward threat-related information. 
More recently, the study of attentional biases has moved 
toward the investigation of the processes of attention and 
their relation to the development and maintenance of 
anxiety disorders.
Studies that have investigated the relation between 
emotion and attention have generally used variations of 
three different paradigms: Stroop color-naming tasks, 
visual attention tasks, and dichotic listening tasks 
(MacLeod & Mathews, 1991). In the Stroop color-naming 
task, words are presented in different colors of ink. It 
is the task of the participant to name the color of the ink 
while ignoring the content of the word. Attention to the 
word meaning versus the color of ink is measured by the 
slowing of reaction times in naming of the color of ink. 
When investigating emotional states, the content of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4words presented are mood congruent, e.g. threat-related 
words for studying anxiety disorders.
Using the Stroop color-naming task, several studies 
have shown that anxious participants are significantly 
slower at naming the color of ink when the word content is 
threat-related in comparison to non-threat related words 
(Foa, Feske, McCarthy, Murdock, & Kozak, 19 91; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1985; McNally, Kaspi, Rienmann, & Zeitlin, 1990). 
In general, these studies have found that the color naming 
of threat-related words was slower due to the bias that 
exists in the selective allocation of attentional resources 
toward the threat-related information. For example,
Mathews and MacLeod (1985) showed that anxious 
participants' reaction times in color naming are slower for 
threat words in comparison to non-threat words.
However, the Stroop paradigm had received some 
criticism. Specifically, it had been suggested that the 
Stroop paradigm may not provide an accurate measure of 
attention bias (Mineka & Sutton, 1992) due to the 
automaticity of reading. Specifically, it has been 
proposed that Stroop effects may be due to the ease with 
which words may be read and not due to an attentional bias 
(Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1983). The visual attention and 
dichotic listening tasks were developed in response to 
these criticisms.
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5Visual attention tasks involve the presentation of a 
variety of words on a computer screen, occasionally 
followed by a dot probe in the place of one of the words. 
The dot probe is simply a stimulus that cues the 
participant to respond. It is the task of the participant 
to respond to the probe as quickly as possible by simply 
pressing a key. Attention to the content of the presented 
words is obtained by measuring reaction times to the visual 
dot probe. Faster reaction times to the probe following a 
threat-related stimulus indicated increased attention to 
that stimulus. Similar to the Stroop paradigm, the visual 
attention studies have, in general, shown that anxiety is 
associated with a biased selective allocation of 
attentional resources toward threat (Logan & Goetsch, 1993; 
MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986).
Dichotic listening tasks involve the presentation of 
messages to the participant in each ear with the use of 
headphones. It is the responsibility of the participant to 
shadow, or attend to only one of the messages. A measure 
of attention is then obtained from the participants' recall 
of the content of the shadowed message. Similar to the two 
previous paradigms, the findings of the dichotic listening 
experiments have demonstrated selective attention toward 
threat in anxious groups (Logan & Geotsch, 1993; Mathews &
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6MacLeod, 198 6) as indicated by increased recall of the 
threat information.
Thus, the research on an attentional bias in anxiety 
has documented a clear relation between anxious states and 
the biased allocation of attentional resources toward 
threat-related information. Recent studies have begun to 
investigate the processes of the attentional bias and its 
relation to the development and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders. For example, Kindt and Brosschot (1997) showed 
that there was no difference in the threat-related 
attentional bias for pictures and words. In addition,
Kindt and Brosschot (1998) also demonstrated that the 
attentional bias for threat in anxiety is stable over time 
and responsive to experimental manipulation. McNally, 
Hornig, Hoffman, and Han (1999) suggested that the 
emergence of an attentional bias occurs after the 
development of clinical levels of anxiety.
In summary, the literature has shown a biased 
allocation of attentional resources toward threat-related 
information. Specifically, the attentional bias appears to 
be a stable phenomena responsive to experimental 
manipulation that may emerge after the development of 
clinical levels of anxiety.
Memory Bias In general, a memory bias in anxiety 
deals with the selective encoding, elaboration, and
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7retrieval of threat—related information. A memory bias for 
threat-related words has been demonstrated in post- 
traumatic stress disorder (Zeitlin & McNally, 1991), panic 
disorder (Cloitre & Lebowitz, 1991; McNally, Foa, &
Donnell, 1989), and anxiety states (Mathews, Mogg, May, & 
Eysenck, 198 9). In general, these studies have shown that 
anxious individuals have an enhanced recall of threat- 
related words in comparison to control groups.
However, not all investigations of memory bias in 
anxiety have produced supportive findings. Nugent and 
Mineka (1994) failed to find an implicit memory bias in 
students with a high level of trait anxiety. In addition, 
in their review of cognitive biases in emotional disorders, 
Mineka and Sutton (1992) concluded that the status of a 
memory bias for threat-related information in anxious 
participants is unclear due to conflicting findings. This 
conclusion is in contrast to the overall findings for a 
memory bias for negative information in depression.
Three possible explanations for the conflicting 
findings in the area of memory bias in anxiety have been 
postulated. First, it is possible that a memory bias is 
most prominent with depression (Mineka & Sutton, 1992) and 
the mixed findings are due to the overlap of depression and 
anxiety. Second, some negative findings may be due to the 
content of the stimuli presented in the studies that have
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8failed to show a memory bias. For example, it is possible 
that the stimuli used by Nugent and Mineka (1994) did not 
assess the correct content of threat to detect a memory 
bias, resulting in the null finding for implicit memory.
Finally, Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) recently 
suggested that the inconsistent findings in the memory bias 
research may be due to the way in which the threatening 
information is encoded. Specifically, they proposed that 
with anxiety, the primary cognitive activities are non- 
conscious and exaggerated forms of evolutionary mechanisms. 
Therefore, this basic system which functions to simply 
evaluate threat would be unlikely to result in an encoding 
of threat information in the form of semantic memory. 
Rather, it is more likely that threat information would be 
encoded as perceptual representations. Due to this 
possible encoding method, most memory tests may have been 
insensitive to the detection of a memory bias associated 
with anxiety. To date, this specific controversy has not 
been addressed in the literature.
In summary, the literature pertaining to a memory bias 
in anxiety has produced a set of findings that are 
inconsistent. This inconsistency may be due to the ways in 
which the study of a memory bias in anxiety is conducted. 
However, the majority of the empirical evidence supports
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9the conclusion of a memory bias for threat-related 
information associated with anxiety.
Judgmental Bias The judgmental biases associated with 
anxiety have received less attention than attentional and 
memory biases. As a result, the available literature is 
limited, but it is relevant to the current study.
Judgmental biases can be defined as any selective 
processing of emotional information (Mineka & Sutton, 1992) 
that results in systematically biased inferences.
Butler and Mathews (1983) presented one of the first 
articles in the area of judgmental biases in emotional 
disorders. Anxious, depressed, and control participants 
were presented a variety of ambiguous situations. The 
participants then responded to the brief situations with 
their perceived most likely outcome, one of which was 
judged to be threat-related during the pilot phase of the 
study. Both anxious and depressed groups were found to 
overestimate the risk of future negative outcomes in 
comparison to the control group. No difference between the 
two clinical groups was shown in their judgment of future 
events. The results were interpreted as supporting the 
association between anxiety and depression with the 
availability of threat-related information.
Anderson, Spielman, and Bargh (1992) extended the 
research of Butler and Mathews (198 3) to include not only
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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inferences of ambiguous situations but also judgments of 
future events. Control and depressed participants were 
asked to predict both positive and negative events in a 
reaction time task in which subjects were timed in their 
responses. It was hypothesized that the highly depressed 
participants would predict more negative events and show 
faster reaction times in their predictions. As expected, 
the highly depressed participants predicted more negative 
events, fewer positive events, and showed greater 
automaticity (faster reaction times) in their predictions, 
in comparison to the control and low depression groups.
The results, although not directly applicable to anxiety 
states, provide support for the proposition that emotional 
states are associated with negatively biased judgments of 
future events.
MacLeod and Byrne (1996) also investigated the 
prediction of future events in depressed and anxious 
participants. Groups of anxious, anxious-depressed,, and 
control participants were asked to generate future positive 
and negative experiences over three time periods. The time 
periods for the prediction of future experiences included 
within the next week, the next year, and the next five to 
ten years. The number of experiences generated by the 
participants was recorded as the measure of positive and 
negative judgments. It was found that the anxious group
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anticipated significantly more negative experiences, when 
compared to the control group. Furthermore, the anxious- 
depressed group showed both the anticipation of more 
negative experiences and less positive experiences. The 
results were interpreted to suggest that anxiety is 
characterized by increases in negative thinking and that 
depression is characterized by both increased negative and 
decreased positive thinking.
Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, and Swindell (1993) 
studied the misinterpretation of ambiguous stimuli in three 
groups including panic disorder, social phobia, and control 
participants. Internal and external situations were 
presented and the participants made judgments as to their 
explanation of cause. Relative to the control group, both 
anxious groups interpreted more internal and external 
situations as threatening. In addition, the panic disorder 
participants were found to choose a threat-related 
explanation for interoceptive (internal) stimuli more often 
than the social phobics. Activation of threat-related 
memory schemas was offered by the authors to explain the 
judgment bias. This conceptualization supports the notion 
that activation of threat-related memory is related to 
pessimistic predictions of future events.
Of the studies in the area of judgmental biases 
reviewed thus far, it is of note that only Butler and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Mathews (1983) used stimuli that were threat-related. In a 
study of judgmental errors in anxiety, Bentz and Williamson 
(1998) used trait anxiety, perceived personal control, and 
gender as predictor variables for ratings of the 
probability of future threatening events. Participants 
were presented a variety of ambiguous situations and asked 
to predict the probability of specific threatening 
outcomes. The results indicated an interaction of anxiety 
and gender upon probability judgments of future threatening 
events. Specifically, highly anxious female participants 
were found to respond with the most pessimistic judgments 
of future events, but not highly anxious males.
Bentz, Williamson, and Smith (1999) tested the content 
specificity of a judgmental bias associated with different 
levels of anxiety and dietary restraint. Participants were 
administered threat-related and overeating-related stimuli 
and asked to predict several future negative events. The 
results showed that both trait anxiety and dietary 
restraint were associated with the prediction of future 
negative events. In addition, each of the personality 
traits was found to be associated with the congruent 
content of the prediction stimuli. Stated simply, anxiety 
was found to be associated with the prediction of threat 
while dietary restraint was found to be related to the 
prediction of overeating. Finally, an interaction of
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gender and anxiety was found replicating the results of 
Bentz and Williamson (1998). These results suggest that a 
judgmental bias for future negative events may be a 
function of the specific events that are to be predicted, 
and not a general bias across different disorders.
In summary, several conclusions can be made from the 
reviewed literature pertaining to a judgmental bias in 
anxiety. First, anxiety appears to be associated with 
threat-related judgmental errors. Second, the judgmental 
bias in anxiety may be associated with the specific content 
of the events that are to be judged.
Conceptualization Given these empirical findings 
pertaining to cognitive biases, it is possible to draw a 
logical conceptualization of the biases associated with 
anxiety. Situational anxiety can be produced by adverse 
life events and stress. Individuals with higher levels of 
anxiety have been shown to be more likely to attend to, 
encode, and recall threat-related information. In 
addition, it has more recently been shown that anxious 
individuals are also more likely to judge future events as 
more threatening.
Thus, for anxious individuals threat-related 
information is more available in memory than non-threat 
information which may result in the judgment of future 
events that are similarly threat-related. Therefore, a
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lower threshold for the recollection of threatening 
information, greater availability of this information, and 
more probable predictions of future threat may be a factor 
in the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders.
Several cognitive models of psychopathology have used 
parts of this conceptualization of cognitive biases in the 
formulation of their models. For example, Lang (1985) and 
Bower (1981) both proposed network models of emotion in 
which threat stimuli and information may be encoded into 
organized systems that are easily accessed and serve to 
activate fear. Although not specifically addressed by Lang 
(1985) or Bower (1981), activation of the "fear networks" 
would then serve to increase the availability of this 
information leading to threat-related judgments of future 
events.
More recently, Mathews and Mackintosh (19 98) proposed 
the only cognitive model of anxiety that addresses not only 
attentional and memory biases, but also a judgmental bias. 
Specifically, the model proposes a "threat evaluation 
system" (TES) which serves as a decision making mechanism 
to evaluate threat. Input from the TES is increased with 
higher levels of anxiety. The model also recognizes 
voluntary effort on the part of the individual as a second 
factor for input into demand on cognitive processes. 
Therefore, biases arise from the opposing influences of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TES and voluntary effort to result in systematic processing 
of emotional information, including the processing that 
results in judgmental errors.
Finally, Beck and Clark (1997) proposed a schema-based 
cognitive model as an extension of an earlier information 
processing theory (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). Three 
stages of processing are proposed to result in the 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral pattern of anxiety.
In stage I, automatic recognition of information occurs and 
assigns processing priority to threat stimuli. Then, in 
stage II, activation of primitive schemas aimed at survival 
occurs and results in constricted processing of threat to 
give rise to cognitive biases. Finally in stage III, full 
activation of schemas occurs and a secondary appraisal of 
the information results in (1) further escalation of 
anxiety, (2) reappraisal leading to decreased anxiety, or 
(3) avoidance and escape.
With the exception of the model proposed by Mathews 
and Mackintosh (1998), none of the cognitive models 
reviewed have specifically addressed judgmental biases as a 
factor in the development and maintenance of anxiety. This 
may be due to the relative recent emergence of this area of 
cognitive bias research. As will be addressed in the next 
sections, a judgmental bias fits well into these cognitive 
models due to the availability of threat related
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6
information for consideration when individuals make 
probability judgments.
Probability Forecasting
It is important to the present discussion to review 
some of the processes involved in inferring the outcomes of 
future events. First, an understanding of how individuals 
infer future outcomes will aid in the explanation of how 
the reduction of judgmental errors may occur. Second, in 
the case of anxiety, the availability of causes or reasons 
for an event may be related to the estimation of future 
outcomes and subsequently the reduction of errors in 
estimation.
As an example of research on probability forecasting, 
Hoch (1985) asked graduate students to predict future job 
offers, salary, and date of employment. In addition, 
participants generated reasons for why the job offers might 
and might not occur. The predictions of the participants 
were compared to actual outcomes obtained from the school's 
job placement center. The results indicated that accuracy 
of predictions increased when the participants generated 
reasons for negative outcomes. Further, the generation of 
reasons for positive outcomes resulted in lower accuracy of 
predictions in the direction of optimistic estimates of 
future job offers and salary.
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Weinstein (198 0) and Wright and Ayton (1992) also 
investigated the predictions of future events in a sample 
of students. Both studies again showed a general tendency 
for optimistic probability forecasting. In addition, it 
was suggested that forecasting may depend on the 
desirability of the situation (Wright & Ayton, 1992), but 
in general, estimation occurs based on the information that 
is available at the time of the prediction.
There are several conclusions that can be derived from 
the probability forecasting literature. First, the amount 
of information available at the time of prediction is 
central to the accuracy of the forecasting, with positive 
information often leading to inaccurate predictions in the 
positive direction. Second, there appears to be a general 
tendency for participants to predict positive outcomes, a 
general optimistic forecasting. Finally, the accuracy of 
forecasting tends to decrease as the situation becomes more 
personal and there is less information available.
A common factor in the probability forecasting 
literature reviewed thus far is the investigation of 
prediction of future events in samples of novice 
participants. Probability forecasting in samples of expert 
participants has also been studied. The estimation of the 
probability of future events in a sample of experts may be 
different from forecasting by novices.
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Wright, Rowe, Bolger, and Gairanack (1994) outlined 
several possible ways in which experts may be superior to 
novices at forecasting future events. First, experts may 
be better calibrated in a specific domain, but equally 
inconsistent with respect to the laws of probability. 
Second, expertise may be achieved through simple training 
in the laws of probability, and therefore more consistent 
with the laws of probability. Third and finally, experts 
may be equally poor to non-experts in their calibration in 
a specific domain, but for reasons other than knowledge of 
the laws of probability they are better at prediction. 
Stated simply, experts may be better at forecasting in 
their specific task, they may be more knowledgeable in 
probability laws, or they may be better at forecasting for 
some other unidentified reason.
In fact, the quality of judgments made by experts has 
been shown to be superior to judgments of novices. Murphy 
and Brown (1985) found that weather forecasters produce 
superior predictions of rain. In addition, Vertinsky, 
Kanetkar, Vertinsky, and Wilson (198 6) showed that hockey 
players can provide high quality probability estimates of 
the results of their future games. However, identification 
of the precise factors which result in optimal judgment 
remains to be established in future research. Thus, 
probability forecasting in experts may be more accurate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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than in non-experts. However, the precise factors involved 
in the accuracy of judgments remains to be investigated. 
Cognitive Heuristics
The ways in which individuals make judgments of 
frequency, chance, and group membership is often explained 
by the operation of heuristics, or mental shortcuts, that 
simplify the judgment and decision process. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1972, 1982) have described a number of heuristics 
that are commonly used in human judgment. These include 
the representativeness, availability, and the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics. The three heuristics are reviewed 
given their relevance to the judgmental processes in 
predicting future events.
The representativeness heuristic refers to a decision 
making process in which a person makes judgments based on a 
comparison to a prototypical example of a similar event.
For example, when judging the likelihood of an event, a 
person may compare the situation to a typical event with 
similar circumstances. This heuristic has been shown to be 
frequently used in judgments and decisions of everyday life 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) and in clinical judgments (Garb,
1996).
The availability heuristic refers to a decision making 
process in which the person makes judgments based on the 
ease with which they can recall or cognitively construct
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relevant instances. For example, the ease with which an 
individual can recall events will result in a higher 
probability estimate, when the individual is asked to judge 
the frequency of a similar events occurrence. Anderson, 
Lepper, and Ross (198 0) identified two variables that 
mediate availability judgments: (1) imagery of the event
and (2) perceived reasons or causes of the event. It is 
proposed that the first occurs in novel situations for 
which there are few similar events encoded in memory from 
experience and the second occurs in other instances of 
availability judgments.
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic refers to a 
decision making process in which people make estimates by 
considering an initial value that they then adjust to yield 
the final estimate. For example, when asked to judge the 
distance of an object, a person often will use a known 
anchor then adjust their judgment accordingly. Anchoring 
biases have been shown to robustly influence judgments 
concerning external information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), 
but they may have less of an impact on self-related 
judgments.
The most recent advancements in the area of heuristics 
research has focused on the use of these heuristics in 
various situations. Agnoli and Krantz (1989) suggested a 
"competing heuristic model" in which the process by which a
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heuristic is selected for use is determined by a 
competition between the heuristics. In addition, it was 
suggested that some heuristics are "natural," while others 
are acquired through learning or experience.
Czaczkes and Ganzach (1996) studied the processes by 
which heuristics compete and become dominant. In a series 
of several experiments, the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic was compared to the. representativeness heuristic. 
It was found that factors of the situation mediated which 
judgment heuristic was used. Specifically, saliency of a 
potential anchor increased the reliance on the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic. However, compatibility between 
the predictor and potential outcome increased the reliance 
on the representativeness heuristic. Overall, these 
results support the "competing heuristic model" as proposed 
by Agnoli and Krantz (198 9).
Garb (1996) studied the representativeness versus the 
past-behavior heuristics in clinical judgments. In a 
series of three experiments, clinicians made diagnostic 
judgments from case history information. Similar to 
Czaczkes and Ganzach (1996), factors of the situation were 
found to determine which heuristic was used when making 
judgments. The representativeness heuristic was used by 
the clinicians when making judgments of diagnosis.
However, when judgments involved predictions about the
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patients' future behavior, it was found that the clinicians 
used the past-behavior heuristic.
Thus, two conclusions can be derived from the 
literature review of cognitive heuristics. First, 
heuristics such as the representativeness, availability, 
and the anchoring and adjustment heuristics are mental 
shortcuts for making judgments in a variety of everyday 
situations. Second, the particular heuristic that is used 
in a given situation depends on the factors of that 
situation.
Debiasina
The study of the reduction of judgmental errors has 
developed across multiple areas of the literature and has, 
in general, shown mixed results. The debiasing literature 
covers the areas of risk perception, clinical judgment, and 
decision making. One common factor in this literature is 
the study of the reduction of judgment errors that have 
been identified in the context of cognitive heuristics, or 
mental shortcuts. An important component of this 
literature is that the existing studies have not addressed 
the process of debiasing in the context, of emotion, and 
more specifically anxiety.
A review of the debiasing techniques is addressed for 
relevant findings given their pertinence to the current 
study. In addition, the implications for debiasing in the
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context of anxiety and its association with the pessimistic 
judgments of future threat are discussed.
Fischoff (1977) presented one of the first articles on 
debiasing of judgmental errors. Participants were asked to 
respond to 75 general questions by assigning a probability 
of being correct to two possible answers. Results 
indicated that the. participants overestimated how much they 
would have known before being told the answer, a knew-it- 
all-along effect. In addition, attempts to debias these 
judgmental errors, by either informing participants about 
the bias or asking them to work harder, failed to result in 
a reduction of the bias.
Friedlander and Phillips (1984) investigated the 
reduction of anchoring errors in two groups of 
undergraduate participants. A control group and a group 
that was warned of anchoring errors were asked to read case 
studies in which important information concerning clinical 
diagnosis of disease was presented. The participants 
completed both diagnostic judgment ratings and confidence 
ratings. The debiasing method used in the study was an 
educational technique that informed the participants of the 
possibility of errors in judgment due to the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic. No anchoring effect was found in the 
control group, eliminating the possibility to evaluate the 
educational debiasing technique. However, participant
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confidence ratings in their judgments were found to be low, 
resulting in the author's speculation that the low 
confidence level led to a decreased susceptibility to the 
anchoring effect. The implication for debiasing was that 
the experimental procedures may require stimuli in which 
the participants have confidence in their judgments.
Sharpe and Adair (1993) studied the reduction of the 
hindsight bias and addressed a rival hypothesis of demand 
characteristics. The hindsight bias is defined as the 
increased confidence in judgments after being provided 
information as to the validity of the statement. In two 
similar experiments, -participants were provided an 
explanation of the hindsight bias and asked to either 
produce the bias or not to produce the bias. When 
participants were asked not to produce the hindsight bias, 
the hindsight error in judgment was still found. Further, 
when participants were asked to produce the bias, 
especially exaggerated judgment ratings were found. The 
authors concluded that the manipulation of instructions 
does little to eliminate the hindsight bias. This 
educational technique for debiasing judgments was similar 
to the technique use by Friedlander and Phillips (1984) and 
suggests that simple awareness of the judgment error does 
not reduce a judgment bias. Furthermore, Sharpe and Adair 
(1993) concluded that an increase in demand characteristics
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can. lead to an even more robust hindsight bias, a finding 
that will be discussed in greater detail in the later 
section devoted to demand characteristics.
In a study of optimistic biases of perceived health 
risks, Weinstein and Klien (1995) investigated several 
debiasing techniques in altering ratings of personal health 
risks. In a series of four experiments, participants were 
given four different debiasing interventions that were 
hypothesized to reduce the optimistic bias. The debiasing 
interventions included educational, imagery, risk factor 
focus, and risk factor generation techniques. All 
debiasing methods were unsuccessful in reducing optimistic 
risk judgments. Reminding people of health risks and 
having the participants compare themselves to low-risk 
people, the educational and imagery debiasing techniques, 
did not reduce the optimistic bias. Furthermore, the tasks 
of having participants focus on health problems, the risk 
factor focus and risk factor generation debiasing 
techniques, actually resulted in an exaggerated bias.
Mumma and Wilson (1995) investigated the debiasing of 
anchoring effects in clinical judgments of personality 
characteristics. Participants were presented a description 
of an individual's personality characteristics and then 
they were asked to make stable/unstable and 
introversion/extroversion judgments of that individual.
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Three types of debiasing techniques were used which 
included bias inoculation, consider-the-opposite, and note 
taking methods. The bias inoculation technique was an 
educational method of debiasing in which the participants 
were instructed in the use of an adjustment to compensate 
for the initial anchor. The consider-the-opposite method 
had participants focus on opposite personality 
characteristics to the cues presented in the description. 
Finally, the note taking method had participants write down 
the cues of the personality characteristics presented in 
the description. The results indicated that all three 
methods of debiasing resulted in a reduction of the 
anchoring bias. In addition, the two methods that forced 
participants to focus on the critical information presented 
in the description, the consider-the-opposite and note 
taking methods, showed a significantly greater reduction in 
the anchoring effect in comparison to the educational 
method, bias inoculation. Mumma and Wilson ('1995) 
suggested that these two techniques functioned to increase 
the accessibility of alternative information to reduce the 
anchoring effect.
Hirt and Markman (1995) studied the process with which 
debiasing occurs for another judgmental bias called the 
explanation bias. TlSe explanation bias is an increase in 
judgments of subjective probability that occurs after
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participants are provided with an explanation of why the 
outcome would occur. In the Hirt and Markman (1995) study, 
participants were presented a variety of explanations of 
situations, for example a winning sports team, and the 
outcome of the likelihood of upcoming games was judged. 
Several variations on the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing 
technique were used and included generation of multiple 
outcomes, generation of the opposite outcome, and 
generation of highly unlikely outcomes. Overall findings 
indicated that techniques that involved the generation of 
alternative outcomes resulted in a reduction of the 
explanation bias. Hirt and Markman (1995) concluded that 
the increased accessibility of alternative information 
resulted in the reduction of the explanation bias.
In a study of anchoring effects, Whyte and Sebenius 
(1997) investigated the presentation of single versus 
multiple anchors in the reduction of the anchoring effect 
for both individuals and groups. Participants were given 
information regarding a fictitious product and they were 
asked to negotiate the sale of the product. The results 
indicated that participants in a group setting were as 
susceptible to the anchoring bias as were individuals. In 
addition, providing the participants with multiple anchors, 
and thus increasing the amount of information, did not 
reduce the bias.
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In another study of group judgment, Lim and Benbasat 
(1997) investigated the debiasing of the representativeness 
heuristic. Participants in groups of three were presented 
personality profiles of engineers and lawyers as a modified 
base-rate problem originally used by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974). In addition, half of the participants were able to 
use a computer generated "problem-representation" tool that 
graphically displayed a map of the lawyers and engineers. 
Use of the computer generated support system led to greater 
awareness of the base-rate fallacy and a reduction in the 
representativeness error. Lim and Benbasat (1997) 
attributed the debiasing result to the increased awareness 
of base-rates and the increased, amount of information 
available from the computer generated support system.
Overall, the studies on the debiasing of judgment 
errors that have been presented thus far are laboratory 
investigations of the cognitive heuristics and various 
techniques to reduce errors in judgment. However, there is 
another area of the literature that examines debiasing in a 
different manner, namely, the study of the reduction of 
biases in judgment that result from personal experience.
Dolinski, Gromski, and Zawisza (1989) collected data 
from participants in Opole, Poland approximately one week 
after the 198 6 explosion of the Chernobyl atomic power 
station in the Ukraine. Participants rated their perceived
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risk and the perceived risk of others for a variety of 
negative events including contracting diseases, being 
involved in accidents, and being the victim of crime. In 
comparison to the ratings of others, the participants 
indicated an unrealistic optimism for their own likelihood 
of experiencing future crime, accidents, and for suffering 
from heart disease. However, for negative events related 
to radiation exposure, the participants rated themselves as 
especially susceptible in comparison to others. The 
results suggest that the personal experience of the 
Chernobyl disaster reduced the optimistic bias of perceived 
risk for radiation-related negative events.
Burger and Palmer (1992) asked university students who 
had experienced the northern California earthquake of 198 9 
to estimate the probability that they and other "average" 
students would experience several negative life events.
The negative life events used in the study included health, 
crime, accident, and natural disaster related outcomes.
The results indicated an unrealistic optimism for the 
negative life events related to health, crime, and 
accidents. However, this optimism for the life event 
related to natural disasters was not found immediately 
after the earthquake. The optimism for natural disasters 
returned three months later. The results suggest that
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personal experience may lead to a reduction of the 
optimistic bias, but only in the short term.
Rutter, Quine, and Albery (1998) studied the 
perceptions of risk in motorcyclists. Participants 
completed several questionnaires, rated the likelihood of 
accidents and injury for themselves and others, and 
reported their history of risky motorcycle riding. Results 
showed that motorcyclists were unrealistically optimistic 
about their chances of being in an accident. Decreased 
perceptions of risk were associated with higher age, higher 
educational levels, and higher levels of riding experience. 
However, when participants who reported having experienced 
an accident in the past were compared with those who had no 
experience of an accident, a significant difference in the 
perceptions of risk was found. Specifically, experience 
with a past accident was associated with a "relative 
realism" of perception of risk, a reduced optimistic bias 
for the likelihood of future accidents.
Finally, Stapel and Veltuijsen (1996) conducted two 
studies to test the hypothesis that indirect experience can 
reduce perceptions of risk. Undergraduate participants 
were presented newspaper articles with varying levels of 
vividness of the story and self-relevance to the 
participants. The participants then made personal and 
societal risk judgments. The results showed that indirect
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experience of highly vivid and self-relevant information 
was associated with a reduction of perceived risk. These 
findings concerning indirect experience are consistent with 
the results of direct experience upon perceived risk 
(Burger & Palmer, 1992; Dolinski, Gromski, & Zawisza, 1989; 
Rutter, Quine, & Albery, 1998).
In summary, the current state of the debiasing 
literature suggests several conclusions. First, 
educational debiasing strategies appear to do little for 
the reduction of the targeted biases. Second, techniques 
that force the participant to focus on the stimuli that 
were presented also do not appear to reduce the bias, and 
may in fact even create a more robust judgmental bias. 
Third, techniques that force the participant to focus on 
alternative information or alternative outcomes appear to 
significantly reduce the targeted bias. And finally, 
personal experience with negative events appears to reduce 
the optimistic bias for that specific event.
A review of the debiasing literature was presented by 
Arkes (1991) . Arkes introduced three separate categories 
of judgment errors which included strategy-based errors, 
association-based errors, psychophysically-based errors.
In addition, several techniques to reduce the biases were 
proposed. Specifically, for strategy-based errors, it was 
proposed that debiasing should occur when the benefits of
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accurate judgment are increased. For association-based 
errors, debiasing should occur with the performance of a 
behavior that activates different associations within the 
semantic memory. Finally, for psychophysically-based 
errors, debiasing should occur with a change in the 
person's perception of their location on the nonlinear 
curve depicting the relationship between the external 
stimuli and the response to the stimuli.
The reduction of judgmental errors for the current 
study primarily focuses on Arkes' (1991) association-based 
errors and the results of these judgmental bias studies 
follows Arkes' proposal of effective debiasing. 
Specifically, the studies that show a reduction in 
judgmental errors use techniques that serve to activate 
alternative associations within semantic memory (Hirt & 
Markman, 1995; Lim & Benbasat, 1997; Mumma & Wilson, 1995).
However, it is important to note that the available 
literature pertaining to debiasing focuses on simple 
strategies to reduce common judgmental errors in normal 
populations. The current study proposes to investigate the 
reduction of pessimistic judgmental errors associated with 
anxiety. In the next section, cognitive-behavior therapy 
and its role in debiasing will be addressed.
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Role of Debiasincr in Cocrnitive-Behavior Therapy
Possibly the most significant implication of this 
study is the role that debiasing may play in cognitive- 
behavior therapy. The importance of the reduction of 
pessimistic thoughts of future events.has been noted in 
established cognitive-behavioral treatment programs. 
However, the recognition of thi_s potential benefit for the 
treatment of anxiety disorders has not been addressed in 
the current cognitive models of the development and 
maintenance of anxiety. Each of these specific points will 
be discussed briefly to emphasize the role that debiasing 
may play in cognitive-behavioral treatment of anxiety 
disorders.
The reduction of pessimistic predictions of future 
events has been recognized as therapeutic in a few 
established treatment programs (Craske, Barlow, & O'Leary, 
1992; Barlow & Craske, 1994) . Specifically, Craske et al. 
(19 92) included in their treatment manual for Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder a section devoted to the overestimation of 
risk. The treatment program offers several techniques to 
reduce the patient's perception of risk including 
monitoring exercises and generation of realistic 
probabilities of event occurrence. However, it is 
important to note that the Mastery of Your Anxiety and 
Worry (MAW) program does not offer the specific treatment
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technique of the generation of alternative outcomes and 
only mentions the ultimate goal of considering 
alternatives.
Barlow and Craske's (1994) Mastery of Your Anxiety and 
Panic II (MAP-II) treatment program for Panic Disorder also 
recognized the importance of the reduction of pessimistic 
predictions of future events. In this treatment program, 
monitoring exercises were used as a therapeutic technique 
to reduce judgmental errors. In addition, direct 
behavioral testing of predicted threat events combined with 
the monitoring was also recommended. However, similar to 
Craske et al. (1992), Barlow and Craske (1994) did not 
offer the generation of alternative outcomes as a specific 
therapeutic technique to reduce the judgmental errors.
The two treatment programs briefly reviewed above have 
been shown to be effective in the treatment of anxiety 
disorders (Craske et al., 1992; Barlow & Craske, 1994). 
Unfortunately, the specific components of the programs have 
not been empirically studied to investigate the .parts of 
the programs that are successful in the reduction of 
anxiety symptoms. The techniques for the reduction of the 
overestimation of risk offered by Craske et al. (1992) and 
Barlow and Craske (1994) do not appear to follow the 
empirical findings in the debiasing literature.
Specifically, the techniques offered do not apply a
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generation of alternatives approach to the reduction of 
pessimistic predictions of future threatening events. 
However, this may be explained by the fact that previous 
cognitive models of the development and maintenance of 
anxiety have failed to address judgmental biases.
As presented earlier, current cognitive models of 
anxiety have emphasized attentional, memory, and judgmental 
biases in the development and maintenance of anxiety. It 
remains to be seen what results will be found when specific 
techniques for the reduction of cognitive biases are 
applied to the treatment of anxiety disorders. However, 
the potential benefit of the alleviation of anxiety 
symptoms and behaviors is one possible result of debiasing.
A small body of research exists that has investigated 
the cognitive changes that result from treatment. In 
general, these studies have used various measures of 
attentional, memory, and judgmental biases before and after 
a patient's participation in a treatment program. It is 
hypothesized that some component of the psychotherapy will 
result in a reduction of the cognitive biases being 
measured. However, the current stage of the research has 
not investigated specific debiasing techniques, nor if the 
reduction in the cognitive biases results in an alleviation 
of anxiety symptoms and behaviors.
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Mathews, Mogg, Kentish, and Eysenck (1995) had 
participants complete both a Stroop color-naming task and a 
word completion task before treatment, after treatment, and 
at a three-month follow-up. An anxious group, consisting 
of participants with a diagnosis of generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD), was given an anxiety management procedure 
that included relaxation training, cognitive coping 
strategies, and graded exposure. The treatment resulted in 
a reduction of the cognitive biases.
Mogg, Bradley, Millar, and White (1995) presented a 
control group and a group of generalized anxiety patients 
(GAD) with a Stroop color-naming task at pre-treatment, 
post-treatment, and follow-up. The treatment consisted of 
cognitive and behavioral procedures including relaxation 
and cognitive coping techniques. Initially, the GAD group 
showed the expected attentional bias for threat-related 
information in comparison to the control group. At post­
treatment, no attentional bias was found. However, at 
follow-up the attentional bias was again significant. The 
results suggest that the cognitive-behavioral treatment was 
successful at normalizing the attentional bias. However, 
the attentional bias may not be a stable phenomena in that 
it varies over time.
Westling and Ost (1995) had patients respond to body 
related and external situations before treatment, after
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treatment, and at a follow-up. The patients were randomly- 
assigned to either an applied relaxation (AR) treatment or 
cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT). At pre-treatment, a 
judgmental bias was found that was specific to body related 
stimuli, in comparison to the control group. No threat- 
related judgmental bias for external stimuli was found. At 
post—treatment, both AR and CBT were found to lead to a 
normalization of the threat bias and there was no 
superiority of either treatment method. The results 
suggest that cognitive changes that occur with 
psychological treatment include a normalization of threat- 
related judgmental errors.
Thus, cognitive and/or behavioral treatment techniques 
appear to normalize the attentional, memory, and judgmental 
biases associated with anxiety. Which specific component 
or cognitive process of the treatment procedures that 
result in this normalization is unclear at this time. 
However, the potential benefit of a reduction" in judgmental 
cognitive biases is considerable for the treatment of 
anxiety.
It is important to note that the normalization of 
biases in anxiety has been shown after many sessions of 
cognitive-behavior therapy. The current dissertation 
proposes a technique to reduce pessimistic predictions of 
future events associated with high levels of anxiety
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responsiveness with a simple strategy in a short period of 
time. However, the study can be viewed as the 
investigation of one of the specific components of CBT and 
its ability to reduce one specific type of cognitive bias, 
namely j udgmental errors.
Demand Characteristics
Demand characteristics are defined as experimental 
cues which influence participants to respond in specific 
ways that serve to validate the experimental hypothesis 
(Fernandez & Turk, 1994). The importance of demand 
characteristics in psychological experiments was 
highlighted over 30 years ago in a series of studies and 
writings by Orne (1962, 1970, 1973).
Orne made several assumptions of demand 
characteristics that have become a widely shared consensus 
among researchers without adequate evidence. First, Orne 
(1970) assumed that experimental participants have a desire 
to help science, presumably because the success of the 
study will make their service worthwhile. Second, Orne 
(1962) assumed that experimental participants seek to 
ascertain the purpose of the study. Finally, it is assumed 
that participants are eager to confirm the hypothesis or 
purpose of the study (Orne, 1973).
However, the assumptions of demand characteristics as 
outlined by Orne (1962, 1970, 1973) have not been supported
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in the literature. In a review of the literature,
Berkowitz and Troccoli (198 6) concluded that there is 
little support for Orne's assumptions.
In a study that examined the tendency of participants 
to confirm a hypothesis from the experimental cues, 
Buchwald, Strack, and Coyne (1981) investigated a mood 
induction procedure and assessed the participants' belief 
that their level of affect would be influenced.. The 
results showed that although a clear mood induction 
occurred, the participants believed that their feelings 
could not be influenced by reading and thinking about the 
statements given in the induction procedure. Stated 
simply, although experimental cues for mood induction were 
present, i.e. demand characteristics, the participants did 
not show a conscious willingness or desire to confirm the 
hypothesis.
The findings presented thus far suggest that the 
assumptions of demand characteristics as presented by Orne 
(1962-, 1970, 1973) may be flawed. However, these findings 
are not suggestive that an alteration of responses due to 
experimental cues does not occur. As proposed by Berkowitz 
and Troccoli (1986), it is possible that the role of demand 
characteristics is exaggerated. However, it remains a 
possibility that experimental cues alter responses of 
experimental participants in measurable ways.
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For example, Alloy, Abramson, and Viscusi (1981) and 
Polivy and Doyle (1980) also studied a mood induction 
procedure and asked participants to simulate the affective 
reaction. In both studies, a pattern of "over-reaction" 
was noted where the participants gave more extreme 
responses than the actual mood induction. The mood 
induction itself was unresponsive to demand 
characteristics. These results suggest that experimental 
demand may lead to an exaggerated result, while showing 
little ability to reduce the mood induction.
In the only study that has specifically addressed 
demand characteristics in the debiasing of judgments,
Sharpe and Adair (1993) investigated the reduction of the 
hindsight bias while manipulating instructions.
Participants were informed of the errors in judgment 
associated with the hindsight bias. They were asked either 
to produce or to not produce the bias by manipulation of 
instructions. In the group that was asked to* not produce 
the hindsight bias, the low demand condition, the bias was 
unaffected by the instruction. However, in the group that 
was asked to produce the hindsight bias, the high demand 
condition, biased judgments were found to be even more 
elevated indicating a more robust hindsight bias. The 
authors concluded that manipulation of instructions does 
little to reduce the judgmental errors associated with the
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hindsight bias. Furthermore, an increase in demand 
characteristics appeared to lead to an even more robust 
hindsight bias. It is important to emphasize that 
manipulation of demand characteristics did not result in a 
reduction of the hindsight bias, but an exaggeration of the 
bias. This finding supports the results of Alloy,
Abramson, and Viscusi (1981) and Polivy and Doyle (198 0).
Thus, demand characteristics remain a rival hypothesis 
for the debiasing of judgmental errors. Although the 
assumptions of demand characteristics may be flawed, as 
outlined by Orne (1962, 1970, 1973), the specific study of 
the relationship between experimental demand and the 
debiasing of judgmental errors in anxiety remains to be 
accomplished.
It is important to note for the purpose of the current 
study the two main methods used in the investigation of 
demand characteristics. First, experimental demand is 
often manipulated by the presentation of different 
instructions creating groups of high and low demand 
characteristics (Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981; Polivy & 
Doyle, 1980; Sharpe & Adair, 1993). Second, several 
studies have used a procedure that includes a debriefing 
strategy in which participants are explicitly questioned 
after the experiment to probe for the possibility that they 
were responding to the experimental cues of the study
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(Schaller, Asp, Rosell, & Heim, 1996). It is this 
debriefing strategy and the inclusion of a second set of 
prediction stimuli that will be used in the current study 
to probe for the demand present within the experimental 
treatment.
From this review of the research literature, it was 
possible to construct a formulation of the theoretical 
concepts for this study. Situational anxiety can be 
produced by adverse life events and stressors. Individuals 
with higher levels of anxiety responsiveness have been 
shown to be more likely to attend to, encode, and recall 
threat-related information. In addition, it has more 
recently been shown that anxious individuals are also 
likely to judge future events as more threatening.
Thus, anxious individuals have threat-related 
information that is more available than non-threat 
information, which may result in the judgment of future 
events that are similarly threat-related. Therefore, the 
combination of easily recalled threatening information, 
availability of this information, and predictions of future 
threat may be a factor in the development and maintenance 
of anxiety disorders.
The debiasing of judgmental errors has been suggested 
to occur when the activation of alternative associations
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within memory occurs. According to the probability 
forecasting literature, the information that is available 
at the time of prediction is directly related to the 
accuracy of the prediction. In the case of higher levels 
of anxiety, the information that is available is likely to 
be threat-related, leading to pessimistic predictions of 
future threat.
However, if an individual with higher levels of 
anxiety can learn to or, in the case of the current study, 
be instructed to consider alternative information, the 
available information at the time of prediction is less 
likely to be threat-related. This availability of more 
neutral or even positive information may lead to 
predictions of future events that are less threat-related.
This process of availability of information leading to 
predictions may be different for males and females. As 
reported earlier, Bentz and Williamson (1998) and Bentz et 
al. (1999) found an interaction of anxiety and gender upon
future threat probability judgments such that highly 
anxious female participants responded with the most 
pessimistic judgments of future events. Previous studies 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) have hypothesized that gender 
differences in ruminative thinking may account for 
differences in the prevalence of depression. Therefore, 
one possible explanation of this interaction between gender
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and anxiety is that women may perceive the environment as 
more threatening, resulting in the interaction of gender 
and actual life events that produces anxiety to yield more 
pessimistic probability ratings in highly anxious females.
The study of a judgmental bias associated with anxiety 
and the availability mechanism that theoretically results 
in judgment errors can be criticized due to a 
methodological problem. Specifically, the obvious nature 
of the experimental tasks used in previous studies (Bentz & 
Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999) leads to a demand 
characteristic rival interpretation of the findings.
Stated simply, the judgmental biases may have been due to 
the participants perception of the experimental cues 
inherent within the procedures.
Thus, it was the goal of the current study to 
investigate one debiasing technique, the Consider-An- 
Alternative procedure (Hirt & Markman, 1995) and its 
ability to reduce judgmental errors. In addition, the 
rival hypothesis of demand characteristics was examined as 
a possible explanation of any findings of the reduction of 
judgmental errors.
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Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted in order to test two 
essential methodological questions that are central to the 
completion of the dissertation. First, it was 
methodologically essential for the dependent variable to be 
demonstrated as a sensitive measure of the reduction in 
probability ratings that was expected with the debiasing 
procedure. Without such a measure, it was possible that 
the study would be unable to detect the reduction in the 
prediction bias ultimately resulting in a null finding due 
to a type II error.
Second, in a study that investigates the role of 
demand characteristics it was methodologically essential to 
demonstrate that the experimental cues inherent within the 
stimuli themselves were not causing a response bias. If 
the experimental cues inherent within the stimuli were 
found to cause a systematic response bias, the response 
bias would confound any results that were found to be due 
to an experimental manipulation. Given the obvious nature 
of the experimental task in the current study, reading 
situations and judging outcomes, addressing the 
experimental demand inherent within the stimuli themselves 
averts this possible methodological criticism.
Therefore, a pilot study was conducted with two 
separate experiments, each of which was designed to address
45
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one of the methodological questions. Phase 1 of the pilot 
study was designed to address the question of the 
sensitivity of the dependent variable. Phase 2 addressed 
the demand characteristics inherent within the experimental 
stimuli.
Phase 1
Desian/Rationale Phase 1 of the pilot study was 
designed to test the sensitivity of the dependent variable, 
probability ratings of future threat-related events. Phase 
1 was designed to demonstrate that the participant's 
probability ratings would be a sensitive measure of the 
changes in perceived threat that was expected with the 
debiasing procedure. Specifically, it was hypothesized 
that the participant's probability ratings would decrease 
due to the Consider-An-Alternative (Hirt & Markman, 1995) 
debiasing procedure, when probability ratings are compared 
from pre to post testing.
An experimental design that was similar to the 
dissertation study was chosen for two reasons. First, the 
design and procedures for Phase 1 of the pilot study were 
identical to those proposed for the dissertation, and 
therefore will mimic any results due to debiasing. Second, 
a design for Phase 1 that included the debiasing procedure 
was chosen because this technique was essential to the 
demonstration of a sensitive dependent variable.
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Specifically, a repeated measures design was chosen in 
which the participants complete the identical experimental 
stimuli twice, separated by the Consider-An-Alternative 
debiasing procedure, in a pre-post design. The 
experimental stimuli used in Phase 1 of the pilot study 
were the identical positive and negative stimuli (Appendix 
A and Appendix B) that were used in the dissertation. The 
debiasing procedure was used in Phase 1 because this 
technique was expected to show a decrease in probability 
ratings for the dissertation. Therefore, the debiasing 
procedure offers the most ILikely chance of demonstrating 
the sensitivity of the dependent variable.
In addition, in order to further increase the 
likelihood that the sensitivity of the dependent variable 
would be demonstrated, only participants with a high level 
of anxiety responsiveness were included in Phase 1. A 
criterion for inclusion in Phase 1 of the pilot study was 
set at a trait anxiety T-score of 60 or above on the State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI: Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, 
R. L., & Lushene, R. E., 1370). The criterion for 
participation was chosen b«ecause it provided a group of 
participants that were most important for the dependent 
variable to be able to measure changes in probability 
estimates. Stated simply, if no change in probability 
estimates was detected for a group of highly anxious
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participants, then it would be even less likely that the 
dependent variable would be a sensitive measure for 
participants with lower levels of anxiety responsiveness.
Participants A total of 4 9 students were screened for 
participation in Phase 1 of the study. Twelve students met 
the criteria of a trait anxiety T-score of 60 or above (3 
male and 9 female). The sample included a racial make up 
of five Caucasian (41.7%), five Hispanic (41.7%), and two 
African-American (16.7%) participants. The average age of 
the sample was 19.5 years (££ = 1.8 years) . Finally, the 
mean trait anxiety for the participants was a T-score of 
65.5 (£12 = 6.7) .
Results Two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted, 
one each for the positive and negative experimental 
stimuli. The repeated measures variable utilized in the 
analyses were the pre and post-testing probability ratings.
For the negative experimental stimuli, a significant 
main effect for the within subject repeated measure was 
found (£[1,11] = 4.94, p. < .05). Average probability 
ratings for the negative pre-testing (mean = 59.9%, ££ = 
11.65) and the negative post-testing (mean = 53.1%, SD = 
14.39) showed a decrease in future threat estimates as 
hypothesized. For the positive experimental stimuli, the 
repeated measure was found to be nonsignificant (£[1,11] = 
2.94, p = NS) .
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Discussion Phase 1 of the pilot study was designed to 
test the sensitivity of the dependent variable by 
demonstrating that the participant's probability ratings 
would be a sensitive measure of the changes in perceived 
threat that were expected with the debiasing procedure.
The analysis showed that there was a significant difference 
in threat probability ratings from pre to post-testing, 
when separated by the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing 
procedure. This finding suggests that the dependent 
variable, probability ratings, is a sensitive measure of 
the changes in likelihood estimates that were expected in 
the - dissertation. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
dependent variable can be relied upon as a sensitive 
measure for the dissertation.
Phase 2
Design/Rationale Phase 2 of the pilot study was 
designed to demonstrate that the demand characteristics 
inherent within the experimental stimuli (Appendix A and 
Appendix B) were not causing a systematic response bias. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants who 
complete only the negative experimental stimuli would show 
no difference in probability ratings in comparison to 
participants who completed both the positive and negative 
stimuli. In addition, it was hypothesized that the same
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pattern of results would be found with the positive 
experimental stimuli.
Again, Phase 2 of the pilot study included a design 
that was similar to the dissertation study to create groups 
that were as analogous to the dissertation groups as 
possible. Three groups of participants were administered 
the experimental stimuli in a pre-post repeated measures 
design. The experimental stimuli utilized in Phase 2 were 
identical to the stimuli that were used in the 
dissertation. Group 1 completed both the positive and 
negative experimental stimuli. Group 2 completed only the 
negative stimuli. Finally, Group 3 completed only the 
positive experimental stimuli.
If the demand characteristics inherent within the 
experimental stimuli were causing a systematic response 
bias, then the participants who received only the negative 
stimuli (Group 2) would respond with more extreme 
probability ratings in comparison to the participants who 
received both the positive and negative stimuli (Group 1). 
In addition, the opposite pattern of responses would be 
expected when comparing Group 3 and Group 1, if the demand 
characteristics inherent within the stimuli were causing a 
response bias. However, this pattern of response was not 
expected due to the deliberate construction of the
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experimental stimuli to disguise its purpose with positive 
items, negative items, and reverse scored items.
Participants A total of 57 participants comprised the 
sample of Phase 2 of the pilot study (24 male and 33 
female). The sample was primarily Caucasian (n = 35, 
61.4%), with 11 Hispanic (19.3%), seven African-American 
(12.3%), and four participants identified as other ethnic 
origin (7.0%). The average age of the participants was 
22.09 years (££ = 6.4 years). Finally, the mean trait 
anxiety T-score for the sample was 50.7 (£1) = 8.9).
Results Two repeated measures 2 X 2  ANCOVAs (Group X 
Repeated Measure) were conducted, one each for the positive 
and negative experimental stimuli. Stated simply, Group 1 
was compared to Group 2 in the repeated measure ratings of 
future threat-related events and Group 1 was compared to 
Group 3 in the repeated measure ratings of future positive 
events. The repeated measures variable utilized in the 
analyses were the average pre and post-testing probability 
ratings. Trait anxiety was used as the covariate to 
statistically control for the variance due to anxiety 
responsiveness.
For the negative experimental stimuli, no significant 
main effects for group (£[1,35] = 0.08, p = NS) or the 
repeated measure (£[1,35] = 0.50, p = NS) were found. In 
addition, the interaction between group and the repeated
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measure was found to be nonsignificant (£[1,35] = 0.83, p = 
NS). Trait anxiety was found to be a significant covariate 
(£.[34] =2.30, p < .05) .
A similar pattern of results was found for the 
positive experimental stimuli. No significant main effects 
were found for group (£[1,36] =0.67, p = NS) or the 
repeated measure (£[1,36] = 2.97, p. = NS) . Again, the 
interaction between the independent variables was found to 
be nonsignificant (£[1,36] = 0.93, p = NS) . Finally, trait 
anxiety was again found to be a significant covariate 
(£[35] = 3.59, p < .005) .
Discussion Phase 2 of the pilot study was designed to 
demonstrate that the demand characteristics inherent within 
the experimental stimuli were not causing a systematic 
response bias. As hypothesized, no significant differences 
were found between the group that completed both the 
positive and negative stimuli in comparison to the two 
groups that completed just one set of the experimental 
stimuli. In addition, trait anxiety was found to be 
significantly correlated to probability ratings of both the 
positive and negative stimuli.
These results suggest that the demand characteristics 
inherent within the experimental stimuli would not cause a 
systematic pattern of response that would confound any 
results of the dissertation. Therefore, it can be assumed
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that any main effects found for the high or low demand 
groups in the dissertation may be due to the experimental 
manipulation and not to a confound of the experimental cues 
inherent within the stimuli.
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Participants
Initially, a sample of 476 (197 male and 279 female) 
undergraduate students participated in the study. The 
participants were screened for inclusion using the Trait 
form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI:
Spielberger et al., 1970) as the measure of anxiety 
responsiveness. All participants were volunteers recruited 
through undergraduate psychology classes and sign-up sheets 
posted in the psychology department of Texas Wesleyan 
University in Fort Worth, Texas. Extra credit was given to 
all students who participated in the study. The initial 
sample was primarily Caucasian (n = 330, 69.3%), with the 
remainder of the participants reporting an ethnic make-up 
consisting of 70 (14.7%) African American, 43 (9.0%) 
Hispanic, and 33 (6.9%) participants identified as other
ethnic origin. The average age for the sample of 
undergraduate students was 23.13 years (£1) = 6.17 years, 
Range = 17 to 55 years). Finally, the mean STAI trait 
anxiety T-score for the sample was found to be 51.90 (iLQ. = 
10.02) .
A criterion for inclusion in the highly anxious group 
was set at a T-score of 65 or greater on the trait form of 
the STAI. Data collection was continued until a minimum of 
15 male and 15 female participants were found for both the
54
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debiasing and control groups that met the STAI T-score 
criteria for inclusion in the highly anxious group. Thus, 
the highly anxious group consisted of a minimum of 60 
participants, 15 males for both the debiasing and control 
groups and 15 females for the same two treatment groups.
Participants who were included in the "normal" anxiety 
group were randomly selected from the remaining students 
assessed with the STAI. A trait anxiety criterion for 
inclusion in the "normal" group was set at a T-score of 60 
or less on the STAI. In addition, the participants 
included within the "normal" group were matched to the 
highly anxious participants on several variables including 
treatment group, age, gender, and race. Accordingly, a 
minimum number of 60 participants, 15 males for both the 
debiasing and control groups and 15 females for the same 
two treatment groups, within the "normal" anxiety group 
were identified for inclusion. Therefore, the total sample 
for the experiment was, at a minimum, set at 12 0 
participants.
For both the highly anxious and "normal" groups, a 
total of 132 undergraduate students were found who met 
criteria for inclusion in the study. The racial 
composition of the sample was primarily Caucasian (n. = 106, 
80.3%), with the remaining participants identified as 
African American (n = 16, 12.1%), Hispanic (n = 6, 4.5%),
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and other ethnic origin (n = 4, 3.0%). The average age of 
the study participants was 22.07 years (21) = 4.08 years, 
Range = 18 to 43 years). Finally, the average STAI trait 
anxiety T-score for the participants within the highly 
anxious group was found to be 69.41 (22 = 4.70, Range = 65 
to 82). For the "normal" group, the average STAI trait 
anxiety T-score was 49.77 (22 = 6.01, Range = 35 to 60) .
With one notable exception, the demographic data for 
the highly anxious and "normal" groups were equal due to 
the matching of study participants. Divided in terms of 
gender and treatment group, the number of highly anxious 
male participants in the control group and the debiasing 
group was 15, while highly anxious female participants 
within the control group numbered 20 and within the 
debiasing group numbered 16. However, one male African 
American (Age = 32 years) participant in the highly anxious 
group was matched to another participant in the "normal" 
group with one year difference in age (Age = 33 years).
This match was performed because no exact match was found. 
Finally, three participants identified as highly anxious 
were excluded from the study because no close match could 
be found due to difficult age and race matching.
Assessment Measures
Soielberaer State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) The 
STAI (STAI: Spielberger et al., 1970) is a paper and pencil
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inventory designed to measure both state and trait anxiety. 
The trait form was used for the measurement of the level of 
anxiety responsiveness in all participants and was used to 
group the subjects into a highly anxious and a "normal" 
group. The criteria for inclusion in the highly anxious 
group was any participant that scored at or above a STAI T-
score of 65. The criteria for inclusion in the "normal"
group was any participant that scored at or below a STAI T-
score of 60. Evidence for the reliability and validity of
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory has been reported in 
previous studies (Martuza & Kallstrom, 1974).
Experimental Stimuli A total of twenty experimental 
stimuli were constructed, ten of which present negative 
(threat-related) situations, and ten of which present 
positive situations with content matched to the negative. 
The stimuli were constructed, with minor modifications, 
from the threat-related prediction paragraphs validated by 
Bentz and Williamson (1998). Validation of the prediction 
paragraphs included participant ratings which demonstrated 
that the stimuli were perceived as threatening.
Specifically, the study (Bentz & Williamson, 1998) 
established that the threat-related experimental stimuli 
used in the present investigation were perceived as 
significantly more threatening than a second set of 
stimuli. In addition, Bentz and Williamson (1998)
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demonstrated the validity of the deliminated number line 
rating, used in the current investigation, in comparison to 
two other rating procedures which included a non- 
deliminated number line and a Likert scale. The 
experimental stimuli, judgment ratings, and questions are 
presented in the Appendix A and Appendix B. The randomized 
stimuli are separated into the pre-testing (Appendix A) and 
the post-testing (Appendix B) experimental stimuli. The 
order of presentation of the stimuli to the study 
participants is illustrated in Figure 1.
Half of the prediction questions for the pre and post­
testing stimuli were reverse scored in order to disguise 
the measurement of pessimistic predictions. An equal 
number of reverse scored questions were presented in each 
of the pre and post-testing. Thus, the pre-testing 
consists of a total of twenty experimental stimuli, ten 
each of positive and negative (threat-related) stimuli. 
Furthermore, each of the ten positive and ten negative 
stimuli presented in the pre-testing had five prediction 
questions that were reverse scored. The twenty pre-testing 
experimental stimuli, thus, resulted in five negative 
situations with negative questions, five negative 
situations with positive questions, five positive 
situations with negative questions, and finally five 
positive situations with positive questions. In the
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Pre-Testing Trg.atmg.nt Post-Testing Debrief
group
Control A, E D B, F G
Debiasing A, E C B, F G
A - Pre-Testing Experimental Stimuli (Appendix A)
B - Post-Testing Experimental Stimuli (Appendix B)
C - Consider-An-Alternative Debiasing Stimuli (Appendix C) 
D - Control Stimuli (Appendix D)
E - Pre-Testing Experimental Demand Stimuli (Appendix E)
F - Post-Testing Experimental Demand Stimuli (Appendix F)
G - Debriefing Questions (Appendix G)
Figure 1
Diagram of the study experimental design and order of 
presentation of the stimuli in each phase of the study.
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post-testing, the same twenty paragraphs were presented 
with the opposite prediction questions to the pre-testing 
stimuli.
Only the ratings from the negative (threat) stimuli 
were utilized in the statistical analysis for three 
reasons. First, this study was mainly interested in the 
reduction of pessimistic predictions of future negative 
events that may result from debiasing, not the reduction of 
optimistic predictions. Second, the inclusion of the 
ratings from the positive stimuli in the statistical 
analysis would raise the complexity of findings to a level 
that would make interpretation difficult. Finally, changes 
in the ratings of the positive stimuli were, theoretically, 
less important than the negative (threat) stimuli because 
the debiasing procedure includes only the generation of 
positive outcomes.
The purpose of the inclusion of the positive stimuli 
within the pre and post-testing was to disguise the 
objective of the stimuli as much as possible in order to
minimize the demand characteristics inherent within the
stimuli themselves. The methodological question of whether 
the demand characteristics inherent within the experimental 
stimuli were causing a systematic response bias was
addressed in Phase 2 of the pilot study.
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Consider—An—Alternative Debiasincr Stimuli The 
Consider-An-Alternative debiasing procedure was constructed 
to model the procedures used by Hirt and Markman (1995) and 
to achieve the goal of increasing the salience and 
accessibility of alternative outcomes of the experimental 
situations. Specifically, the twenty experimental stimuli 
identical to the ten positive and ten negative pre and 
post-testing stimuli were presented. Participants were 
then asked to generate three positive alternative outcomes, 
which forced the activation of alternative information.
The generation of alternatives was only completed by 
the debiasing group and not the control group. The 
debiasing stimuli are presented in Appendix C and the order 
of presentation of the stimuli to the study participants is 
illustrated in Figure 1. It is important to note that none 
of the experimental demand stimuli (Appendix E and Appendix 
F), described below, were presented within the debiasing 
condition.
Control Stimuli The control condition stimuli were 
constructed to present the participants with the identical 
experimental situations of the pre and post-testing stimuli 
in order to control for effects due to habituation to the 
stimuli. However, the participants made no judgment 
ratings but only responded with writing the nouns and verbs 
found within the experimental paragraphs. The writing of
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the parts of speech found within the paragraphs was 
included to ensure that the participants read each 
situation. The control condition stimuli are presented in 
Appendix D and the order of presentation of the stimuli to 
the study participants is illustrated in Figure 1. Just as 
with the debiasing condition stimuli above, none of the 
experimental demand stimuli (Appendix E and Appendix F), 
described below, were presented within the control 
condition.
Experimental Demand Stimuli A second set of 
prediction stimuli were constructed to measure the possible 
changes in probability ratings due to the demand 
characteristics inherent within the debiasing procedure.
The experimental demand stimuli were included as a 
manipulation check to ensure that any change in probability 
ratings of the threat stimuli was due to debiasing and not 
due to the experimental demand placed upon the participants 
to change their ratings.
The experimental demand stimuli were constructed to 
present the participants with six situations and outcomes 
for their probability judgment. The six situations were 
constructed to be related to the outcomes of games for two 
reasons. First, the game situations are relatively common 
and easy to imagine and judge. Second, the game situations
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were generally unrelated to the positive and negative 
situations presented in the pre-testing and post-testing.
The game situations and outcomes are presented in 
Appendix E and Appendix F. Again, the order of 
presentation of the stimuli to the study participants is 
illustrated in Figure 1. The six game situations were 
randomly placed within the pre-testing and the post-testing 
experimental stimuli, with the stimuli placed within the 
pre-testing (Appendix E) and the stimuli placed within the 
post-testing (Appendix F) being identical with one notable 
exception. Specifically, as with the pre and post-testing 
experimental stimuli, half of the experimental demand 
stimuli were reverse scored. Thus, in the experimental 
demand stimuli, three questions were worded in terms of 
"what is the probability you will win" and three questions 
were worded in terms of "what is the probability you will 
lose." The opposite question for each situation was 
presented in the pre and post-testing.
The experimental demand stimuli were presented 
randomly within the pre and post-testing, resulting in a 
total of 2 6 items in each of the pre and post-testing 
phases of the experiment. Thus, each pre and post-testing 
consisted of the 20 positive and negative experimental 
stimuli plus the six experimental demand stimuli. However, 
the six experimental demand stimuli were not presented
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within the control or debiasing treatment phase of the 
experiment in contrast to the 20 experimental stimuli.
This design created a measure of the demand 
characteristics inherent within the debiasing treatment. 
Specifically, if the study participants were responding to 
the experimental cues inherent within the debiasing 
procedure, then they would reduce their probability ratings 
on the post-testing experimental demand stimuli (Appendix 
F) and the post-testing experimental stimuli (Appendix B) 
equally. Conversely, if the study participants were 
responding to the debiasing procedure as hypothesized, then 
they would reduce their probability ratings on only the 
post-testing experimental stimuli (Appendix B) and not on 
the post-testing experimental demand stimuli (Appendix F). 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the experimental demand stimuli 
were not presented in the treatment phase of the 
experiment. Therefore, positive alternatives for these 
demand stimuli were not generated in the treatment phase of 
the experiment resulting in no activation of alternative 
information and a measure of the demand characteristics 
inherent within the debiasing procedure.
Debriefing Questions The debriefing questions were 
designed to assess for the possibility that the 
participants were responding to the experimental cues of 
the study. The debriefing questions were constructed to
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assess whether the participant's perception of the purpose 
of the experiment was that they should have changed their 
probability ratings because that was what they thought the 
experiment was intended to find. The debriefing procedure 
has been utilized in previous studies for the assessment of 
demand characteristics (Schaller, Asp, Rosell, & Heim,
1996).
Specifically, the debriefing questions, presented in 
the Appendix G, were three multiple choice questions which 
explicitly ask the participants what they perceived as the 
purpose of the study. As illustrated in Figure 1, the 
debriefing questions were presented to all the study 
participants at the end of the experiment. These questions 
were used to group participants according to their 
perceptions of the purpose of the study to investigate 
demand characteristics.
The first debriefing question was used to categorize 
all participants into four groups, according to the four 
multiple choice answers. The groups included (1) 
participants who responded that the purpose of the study 
was to increase their threat probability ratings, (2) those 
who responded that the purpose was to decrease their threat 
probability ratings, (3) those who responded that the 
purpose was to make no changes in probability ratings, and 
finally (4) those who responded that they did not know the
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purpose of the experiment. These groups were analyzed in 
combination with the ratings from the experimental demand 
stimuli to test for the impact of demand characteristics 
upon probability ratings.
Finally, the third debriefing question was also be 
used to group participants as a test of demand 
characteristics. Specifically, the question was used to 
categorize all participants into two groups, according to 
the two possible answers. The two groups included (1) 
participants who responded that they did notice a procedure 
that suggested the purpose of the experiment was to change 
their probability ratings because they were generating 
alternative ways the situations may end, and (2) those who 
responded that they did not notice such a procedure.
Again, the groups were analyzed in combination with the 
ratings from the experimental demand stimuli to test for 
the impact of demand characteristics upon probability 
ratings.
Experimental Procedures
Undergraduate participants were recruited through 
sign-up sheets posted in the psychology department and 
through psychology classes at Texas Wesleyan University in 
Fort Worth, Texas. All participants were given extra 
credit for their undergraduate classes. The experiments 
were conducted in group settings either during scheduled
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experiment times or at the end of undergraduate classes 
where permission was obtained from the class instructor.
The students began the experiment by reading and signing 
the informed consent form (Appendix H). The informed 
consent form was read verbally by the experimenter to 
ensure understanding and all participants were given the 
opportunity to ask questions.
After consent was obtained, participants then 
completed a short demographic questionnaire and the trait 
form of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI: Spielberger et al., 1970). Participants were then 
randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups. The 
experimental groups included the control group and the 
debiasing group.
After randomization, participants were given a packet 
of information that included the experimental stimuli and 
directions for completion. The packet consisted of the 20 
positive and negative experimental stimuli (Appendix A) and 
the six game-related demand stimuli (Appendix E), all 
randomly presented to the participants. The experimenter 
reviewed the instructions by reading the directions aloud 
while the participants followed on the written directions 
provided. Questions were answered by the experimenter and 
an example reviewed, then the participants were allowed to
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complete the initial examination, the pre-testing. There 
was no time limit for completion of the instrument.
Following the completion of the pre-testing, each of 
the two experimental groups completed their respective 
tasks as outlined below in the treatment groups section. 
Following the completion of the experimental treatment, all 
participants again completed the experimental stimuli, the 
post-testing stimuli presented in the Appendix B and the 
Appendix F, in a similar fashion to the pre-testing.
Again, the stimuli in the post-testing included the 20 
positive and negative experimental stimuli (Appendix B) and 
the six game-related stimuli (Appendix F), all randomly- 
presented to the participants. Finally, after completion 
of the post-testing stimuli, the participants were given 
the three debriefing questions presented in the Appendix G. 
Participants simply circled one response to each of the 
three questions. Upon completion of the debriefing 
questions, all materials were collected and extra credit 
were given to each participant.
Treatment Groups
The debiasing group completed the Consider-An- 
Alternative debiasing procedure (Hirt & Markman, 19 95) as 
the treatment procedure in the pre-post experimental 
design. This procedure consisted of the presentation of 
the same 20 experimental situations as presented in the
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pre-testing, followed by the generation of three 
alternative positive outcomes for each of the situations. 
Participants generated outcomes by simply writing three 
possible positive alternatives for the situation outcomes 
(Hirt & Markman, 1995; Mumma & Wilson, 1995). The stimuli 
for the debiasing group procedure are presented in Appendix 
C. It is important to note that none of the game-related 
experimental demand stimuli were presented during the 
debiasing treatment procedure.
The control group read the same 20 experimental 
situations as the debiasing group. However, instead of 
generating alternative positive outcomes, the participants 
wrote all of the nouns and verbs found in the situation 
paragraph. The recording of the parts of speech in the 
control group was included to ensure that the participants 
completely read each situation. The identical presentation 
of the 20 experimental situations was completed to control 
for any effects due to habituation. The stimuli for the 
control group procedure are presented in Appendix D.
Again, it is important to note that none of the game- 
related experimental demand stimuli were presented during 
the control treatment procedure.
Experimental Design
The experimental design of the study was a 2 X 2 X 2 X 
2 (Pre versus Post-Testing X Control versus Debiasing
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Treatment X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X Male versus 
Female) repeated measures factorial design. The design 
included one within subject independent variable, the 
repeated measure, that consisted of the pre and post­
testing ratings of the participant's probability estimates. 
The between subject independent variables included the two 
treatment groups (Control and Debiasing Groups), the two 
anxiety groups consisting of a high and a "normal" level of 
anxiety responsiveness, and the two gender groups. Thus, a 
total of four independent variables were included in the 
study.
The dependent variable for the study was the average 
score of the 10 threat probability ratings obtained from 
the pre and post-testing experimental stimuli. As stated 
earlier, only the ratings from the 10 negative (threat) 
experimental stimuli were utilized in the statistical 
analysis. The ten positive experimental stimuli were 
included to disguise the purpose of the study and were not 
included in the statistical analysis.
Statistical Analyses/Hypotheses
The analyses utilized in this study conducted several 
statistical procedures for the purpose of examining the 
experimental data. As a result, it is important to note 
that the overall experiment-wise error rate was considered, 
and the appropriate statistical procedures and alpha levels
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 1
chosen. For example, several mixed, factorial Analysis of 
Variance statistical procedures were used to control for 
the elevation of Type I error. In addition, an alpha level 
of .05 was chosen as the level of significance for all 
statistical procedures, with one exception noted in the 
results section due to post-hoc testing. Specifically, a 
Bonferroni correction of the alpha level was made for post- 
hoc testing which resulted in a lower alpha level for the 
post-hoc analysis. All statistical findings falling above 
the alpha of .05 were noted as nonsignificant (NS), with 
the post-hoc analysis notation of nonsignificant results 
adjusted due to the Bonferroni correction of the alpha 
level as indicated in the results section.
Threat Ratings Analysis Probability ratings for each 
of the ten threat-related situations (Appendix A and 
Appendix B) were scored by recording the value of the 
participant'' s rating on the number lines. The responses 
from the five positively worded questions were reverse 
scored to obtain the pessimistic ratings for all five 
items. Then, all ten threat-related ratings were averaged 
to yield a mean threat probability rating for each 
participant. These data were utilized as the dependent 
variable in the statistical analysis investigating the 
threat ratings.
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A mixed factorial 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures 
analysis of variance (Pre versus Post-Testing X Control 
versus Debiasing Treatment X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X 
Male versus Female Gender) was conducted to test for 
differences in the four independent variables. In addition 
to testing for main effects for each independent variable, 
the repeated measures ANOVA allowed the testing of all 
interaction effects between the four independent variables.
It was hypothesized that highly anxious participants 
would report higher probability estimates of future threat- 
related events relative to participants with a "normal" 
level of anxiety responsiveness. Stated simply, a main 
effect for anxiety was expected. Second, it was 
hypothesized that a two-way interaction of treatment group 
and repeated measure upon threat probability ratings would 
be found. The debiasing procedure was expected to reduce 
threat probability ratings from pre to post-testing, while 
the control procedure was not expected to cause a 
systematic change in threat ratings. Therefore, the 
hypothesized interaction was expected to result in the 
post-testing probability ratings of the debiasing group to 
be significantly lower than the ratings of the control 
group (pre and post-testing) and the pre-testing ratings of 
the debiasing group. Finally, it was hypothesized that a 
two-way interaction of gender and anxiety upon threat
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probability ratings would be found. Highly anxious female 
participants were expected to show greater pessimistic 
predictions of future threat than all male participants and 
female participants with a lower level of anxiety 
responsiveness.
A main effect for trait anxiety was expected because 
of previous studies that have found increased pessimistic 
predictions of future threat associated with higher levels 
of anxiety (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999). 
The two-way interaction of treatment group and repeated 
measure upon threat probability ratings was expected 
because of previous investigations that have found the 
Consider-An-Alternative debiasing procedure to be effective 
in the reduction of judgmental errors (Hirt & Markman,
1995; Mumma & Wilson, 1995) . Finally, the two-way 
interaction of gender and anxiety upon threat probability 
ratings was expected due to previous studies that have 
shown this interaction (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et 
al., 1999).
Demand Ratings Analysis A second analysis was 
conducted to test for effects due to demand characteristics 
inherent within the debiasing procedure. Specifically, the 
data collected from the six experimental demand stimuli 
(Appendix E and Appendix F) were analyzed as a separate 
dependent variable. Probability ratings from each of the
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six game-related situations were scored and averaged in a 
similar fashion to the experimental stimuli to yield a mean 
experimental demand probability rating for each 
participant.
The use of the experimental demand ratings as the 
dependent variable created a new independent variable. 
Specifically, the control versus debiasing independent 
variable of the threat ratings analysis was changed to a 
demand versus no demand independent variable. This change 
was accomplished because the game-related dependent 
variable of the demand ratings analysis was not presented 
during the treatment phase of the repeated measure design 
(Figure 1). Thus, a new independent variable was created 
that measured the changes in probability ratings due to the 
experimental cues inherent within the treatment procedure.
As explained earlier in the section devoted to the 
experimental demand stimuli, if the study participants were 
responding to the experimental cues inherent within the 
debiasing procedure, then they would reduce their 
probability ratings on the post-testing experimental demand 
stimuli (Appendix F) and the post-testing experimental 
stimuli (Appendix B) equally. The experimental cues of the 
debiasing procedure would decrease the ratings of both the 
threat and game-related stimuli, even though the
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participants were not generating positive alternatives for 
the game-related stimuli.
Conversely, if the study participants were responding 
to the debiasing procedure as hypothesized, then they would 
reduce their probability ratings on only the post-testing 
experimental stimuli (Appendix B) and not on the post­
testing experimental demand stimuli (Appendix F) . In this 
case, the debiasing procedure of generating positive 
alternatives would decrease the probability ratings of only 
the threat-related stimuli because positive alternatives 
were not generated for the game-related stimuli.
Thus, the analysis of the threat-related ratings 
examined the effects of the treatment procedure. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the game-related ratings 
examined the effects of the experimental demand within the 
treatment procedure. The current demand ratings analysis 
uses only the game-related ratings as the dependent 
variable and therefore the independent variable of control 
versus debiasing treatment is converted to a demand versus 
no demand independent variable.
A similar 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures analysis of 
variance (Pre versus Post—Testing X Demand versus No Demand 
Treatment X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X Male versus 
Female Gender) was utilized for the analysis. The 
independent variables for the analysis again included one
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within subject and three between subject variables. The 
within subject variable was the repeated measure (pre and 
post-testing) of experimental demand stimuli. The three 
between subject variables included (1) the two treatment 
groups consisting of a demand group versus a no demand 
group, (2) the two anxiety groups consisting of a high and 
"normal" level of anxiety responsiveness, and finally (3) 
gender. The dependent variable was the average participant 
probability ratings for the experimental demand stimuli.
The demand group consisted of all participants within 
the debiasing group in the previous threat ratings 
analysis. However, since the experimental demand stimuli 
were not presented during the treatment phase of the study 
(Figure 1), the dependent variable in the current analysis 
was a measure of the changes in probability ratings due to 
experimental cues. Stated simply, the new dependent 
variable, mean demand probability ratings, created one 
treatment group in which experimental demand was present 
and one treatment group in which the demand was absent.
This was achieved because the participants in the demand 
group completed the debiasing procedure, but they did not 
generate positive alternatives 5or the six game-related 
experimental demand stimuli. Therefore, the demand group 
participants were presented with the experimental cues 
inherent within the debiasing procedure, but they did not
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generate positive alternatives for the six experimental 
demand stimuli.
Conversely, the participants in the no demand, group 
did not complete the debiasing procedure and therefore they 
were not presented the experimental cues inherent within 
the procedure itself. However, the design of the 
statistical analysis was the same in comparison to the 
analysis of the previous threat-related stimuli, writh the 
exception of the different dependent variable.
For the demand ratings analysis, it was again 
hypothesized that highly anxious participants will report 
higher probability estimates of future game-related loss 
relative to participants with a "normal" level of anxiety 
responsiveness. This finding was expected to be found with 
a main effect for anxiety. In addition, it was again 
hypothesized that a two-way interaction of gender and 
anxiety upon demand probability ratings would be found.
This interaction was expected to result in highly anxious 
female participants reporting the highest pessimistic 
probability ratings in comparison to all male participants 
and female participants with a lower level of anxiety 
responsiveness. Finally, it was hypothesized that there 
would be no main effects or interaction effects involving 
the repeated measure and the experimental demand 
independent variable.
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The main effect for anxiety was again expected because 
of previous studies that have found increased pessimistic 
predictions of future negative events associated with 
higher levels of anxiety responsiveness (Bentz &
Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999). In addition, the 
two-way interaction of gender and anxiety upon demand 
probability ratings was expected because of previous 
investigations that have found highly anxious female 
participants with the greatest pessimistic ratings of 
future events (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al.,
1999) . Finally, null finding for experimental demand was 
expected because demand characteristics have not been found 
to result in a reduction of judgmental errors (Sharpe & 
Adair, 1993) .
Debriefing Ratings Analysis A third analysis was 
conducted using the debriefing questions (Appendix G) to 
group the study participants into categories of subjects 
with different perceptions of the purpose of the study.
This final analysis used the same dependent variable as in 
the second analysis, mean experimental demand ratings, 
except the study participants were grouped according to 
their perceptions of the purpose of the experiment. Two 
separate analyses, using the first and third debriefing 
questions to group the participants, were conducted. The 
debriefing ratings analysis can be viewed as two secondary
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statistical procedures conducted to verify any effects due 
to demand characteristics that were found in the demand 
ratings analysis.
However, before any regrouping of participants was 
completed, it was important to justify the collapsing of 
participants across treatment groups. Specifically, it was 
important to establish that an approximately equal number 
of participants from the control and debiasing treatment 
groups responded to each of the four alternative responses 
of the first debriefing question. This was important 
because it was possible that a majority of participants 
from the control or debiasing groups responded to just one 
of the alternative responses. In other words, it was 
possible that the participants from the control or 
debiasing groups all had the same perception as to the 
purpose of the experiment. If this was true, then 
regrouping of participants for the debriefing analysis 
would be inconsequential because the majority of 
participants would fall into only one of the four groups of 
perceived purpose of the experiment. Any statistical 
analysis using a grouping of participants according to this 
pattern of response would have misleading findings because 
a majority if the variability would fall into only one 
group.
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As a result, a 2 X 4 chi-square analysis was conducted 
to test the proportion of participants from the control and 
debiasing groups who responded to each of the four
alternative responses of the first debriefing question. If
an approximately equal number of participants endorsed each
response, then the collapsing of participants across
treatment group and regrouping according to the 
participant's responses to the debriefing question could be 
j ustified.
Once the regrouping was justified, participants were 
grouped into four categories of subjects using the 
responses from the first debriefing question.
Specifically, the four groups included participants who 
perceived the purpose of the experiment to (1) increase 
their probability ratings, (2) decrease their probability 
ratings, (3) make no changes in their probability ratings, 
and (4) those who did not know the purpose of the 
experiment.
The subgroups were used i n a 4 X 2 X 2 X 2  (Four 
Perceived Demand Groups X Repeated Measure X Anxiety X 
Gender) repeated measures analysis of variance. The 
independent variables for the analysis included (1) the 
four groups of participants categorized according to their 
perceptions of the purpose of the experiment, (2) the mean 
pre versus post demand probability ratings, (3) the high
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versus "normal" levels of anxiety responsiveness, and (4) 
the male versus female participants. The dependent 
variable for the repeated measures ANOVA was the same mean 
demand probability ratings used in the second analysis.
It was hypothesized that highly anxious participants 
would report higher probability estimates of future game- 
related loss relative to participants with a "normal" level 
of anxiety responsiveness. This finding was expected to be 
found with a main effect for anxiety. In addition, it was 
hypothesized that a two-way interaction of gender and 
anxiety upon demand probability ratings will be found.
This interaction was expected to result in highly anxious 
female participants showing the highest probability ratings 
in comparison to all male participants and female 
participants with a "normal" level of anxiety 
responsiveness. Finally, it was hypothesized that there 
would be no main effects or interaction effects involving 
the repeated measure and the four demand groups. A null 
finding for this analysis was expected because demand 
characteristics have not been found to result in a 
reduction of judgmental errors (Sharpe & Adair, 1993).
Lastly, using the responses from the third debriefing 
question, participants were grouped into two categories of 
subjects. Specifically, the two groups included (1) 
participants who noticed a procedure within the experiment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8 2
which suggested the purpose of the experiment was to change 
their probability ratings, and (2) participants who did not 
notice such a procedure.
The groups were used i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2  (Perceived 
Demand Groups X Repeated Measure X Anxiety X Gender) 
repeated measures analysis of variance. The independent 
variables for the analysis included (1) the two groups of 
participants categorized according to their perceptions of 
the purpose of the experiment, (2) the mean pre versus post 
demand probability ratings, (3) the high versus "normal" 
levels of anxiety responsiveness, and (4) the male versus 
female participants. The dependent variable for the 
repeated measures ANOVA was the same mean demand 
probability ratings used in the second analysis.
Again, it was hypothesized that highly anxious 
participants would report higher probability estimates of 
future game-related loss relative to participants with a 
"normal" level of anxiety responsiveness. This finding was 
expected to be found with a main effect for anxiety. In 
addition, it was again hypothesized that a two-way 
interaction of gender and anxiety upon demand probability 
ratings would be found. This interaction was expected to 
result in highly anxious female participants showing the 
highest probability ratings in comparison to all male 
participants and female participants with a "normal" level
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of anxiety responsiveness. Finally, it was hypothesized 
that there would be no main effects or interaction effects 
involving the repeated measure and the two demand groups.
A null finding for this analysis was expected because 
demand characteristics have not been found to result in a 
reduction of judgmental errors (Sharpe & Adair, 1993).
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Threat Ratings Results
Probability ratings for each of the ten threat-related 
situations (Appendix A and Appendix B) were scored by 
recording the value of the participant'’ s rating on the 
number lines. The responses from the five positively 
worded questions were reverse scored to obtain the 
pessimistic ratings for all five items. Then, all ten 
threat-related ratings were averaged to yield a mean threat 
probability rating for each participant's pre and post 
testing. These data were utilized as the repeated measure 
dependent variable in the statistical analysis 
investigating the threat ratings.
A mixed factorial 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures 
analysis of variance (Pre versus Post-Testing X Control 
versus Debiasing Treatment X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X 
Male versus Female Gender) was conducted to test for 
differences in the four independent variables. In addition 
to testing for main effects of each independent variable, 
the repeated measures ANOVA allowed the testing of all 
interaction effects among the independent variables. It 
was hypothesized that the analysis would find a main effect 
for anxiety, a two-way interaction of gender and anxiety, 
and finally a two-way interaction of treatment group and 
repeated measure.
84
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Significant main effects were found for three of the 
four independent variables. As hypothesized, a main effect 
for anxiety group was found (£[1,124] = 13.35, p. < .001). 
The average threat probability rating for the highly 
anxious group (mean = 4 9.79%, = 13.20) was found to be
significantly greater than the "normal" group (mean = 
42.41%, ££ = 14.58) indicating higher threat-related 
likelihood ratings from the highly anxious participants. 
Second, a significant main effect for gender was found 
(£[1,124] = 47.00, p. < .001). The average threat
probability rating for female participants (mean = 53.03%,
SD = 13.07) was found to be significantly higher than male 
participants (mean = 39.18%, £LL> = 11.65) . Finally, a 
significant main effect for the treatment group was found 
(£[1,124] = 12.70, p < .001). The average threat
probability rating for the control group (mean = 4 9.70%, ££)
= 14.38) was found to be significantly greater than the 
debiasing group (mean = 42.50%, = 13.07). The main
effect for the repeated measure was found to be 
nonsignificant (£{1,124] = 0.58, p. = NS).
All possible interaction effects between the four 
independent variables were tested in the repeated measures 
ANOVA. As hypothesized, a significant interaction of 
treatment group and repeated measure upon threat 
probability ratings was found (£[1,124] = 22.88, p < .001).
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The average threat probability ratings for each of the four 
groups involved in the two-way interaction were as follows; 
Pre-testing Control group (mean = 49.09%, ££ = 14.05), 
Post-testing Control group (mean = 52.48%, £1) = 16.07), 
Pre-testing Debiasing group (mean = 45.13%, ££) = 13.8 6), 
and Post-testing Debiasing group (mean = 40.29%, =
14.28). The.interaction of treatment group and repeated 
measure is illustrated in Figure 2. The repeated measure 
independent variable is presented on the X-axis of Figure 2 
while the two treatment groups are presented by the 
separate bars. The dependent variable is presented on the 
Y-axis.
A post-hoc analysis of the simple effects was 
conducted to determine the exact results within the 
interaction. A total of four t-tests were conducted which 
were Bonferroni corrected to control for the increase in 
Type I error. Thus, the result of this correction was an 
alpha of 0.0125 which was used as the level of significance 
for the four t-tests. Two independent samples t-tests were 
conducted to examine the control versus debiasing group 
ratings for both the pre and post-testing. In addition, 
two paired samples t-tests were conducted to examine the 
pre versus post-testing ratings for both the control and 
debiasing groups. The paired samples t-tests were required
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because the repeated measure pre and post-testing ratings 
violated the assumption of independence of samples.
The difference between the control versus debiasing 
group ratings of the pre-testing was found to be 
nonsignificant (£.[130] = -1.63, p. = NS) . Average threat 
probability ratings for the treatment groups were initially 
found to be equivalent. However, at post-testing the 
control versus debiasing group ratings differed 
significantly (£[130] = 4.58, p < .001). The paired 
samples analysis revealed that the debiasing group ratings 
significantly decreased (£[61] = -3.67, p < .001) and the 
control group ratings significantly increased (£[69] =
3.08, p < .005) from pre to post-testing.
All other interaction effects between the independent 
variables within the repeated measures ANOVA were tested 
and found to be nonsignificant. The test results for each 
of the nonsignificant interaction effects were as follows; 
Anxiety Group X Gender (£[1,124] = 0.34, p = NS), Anxiety 
Group X Treatment Group (£[1,124] = 0.05, p = NS), Anxiety 
Group X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 0.85, p = NS), Gender 
X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 2.42, p = NS), Gender X 
Treatment Group (£[1,124] = 0.44, p = NS), Anxiety Group X 
Gender X Treatment Group (£[1,124] = 0.74, p = NS), Anxiety 
Group X Gender X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 0.23, p =
NS), Anxiety Group X Treatment Group X Repeated Measure
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(£[1,124] = 0-06, e  = NS), Gender X Treatment Group X 
Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 1.01, p. = NS), Anxiety Group X 
Gender X Treatment Group X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 
0.83, p = NS).
Demand Ratings Results
The second set of data was collected to investigate 
the possibility that any systematic change in probability 
ratings was simply due to demand characteristic factors. A 
set of game-related situations was developed to evaluate 
the ratings of several non-threatening situations. 
Specifically, the data collected from the six experimental 
demand stimuli (Appendix E and Appendix F) were used as a 
separate dependent variable. Probability ratings from each 
of the six game-related situations were scored and averaged 
in a similar fashion to the experimental stimuli. Positive 
questions were reverse scored then all six ratings were 
summed and averaged to yield a mean experimental demand 
probability rating for each participant's pre and post 
testing ratings. These data were then utilized as the 
repeated measure dependent variable in the statistical 
analysis investigating demand ratings.
A similar 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures analysis of 
variance (Pre versus Post-Testing X Demand versus No Demand 
X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X Male versus Female Gender) 
was conducted. The design was identical to the previous
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threat ratings analysis with the exception of the change in 
the dependent variable to the game-related experimental 
demand stimuli.
The inclusion of the game-related dependent variable 
converted the control versus debiasing treatment 
independent variable of the previous threat-related 
analysis to the current demand versus no demand independent 
variable. As described earlier, this conversion was an 
appropriate control for the measurement of experimental 
demand within the treatment procedure because the game- 
related stimuli were not administered to the participants 
during the treatment phase of the experiment. Thus, the 
game-related dependent variable measured the change in 
probability ratings due to the experimental cues within the 
treatment phase of the experiment. It was hypothesized 
that the analysis would find a main effect for anxiety and 
a two-way interaction of gender and anxiety. In addition, 
it was hypothesized that there would be no main effect or 
interaction effects found involving the repeated measure.
The results indicated that there was a significant 
main effect for the repeated measure (£[1,124] = 4.22, p. < 
.05). The average game-related probability ratings were 
found to be significantly higher for the post-testing (mean 
= 4 9.60%, = 12.15) in comparison to the pre-testing
(mean = 47.74%, ££ = 10.52). All three other main effects
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were found to be nonsignificant including the main effects 
for anxiety group (£[1,124] = 2.83, e  = NS), gender 
(£[1,124] = 0.01, e  = NS) , and treatment group (£[1,124] = 
1.32, e  = NS).
All possible interaction effects of the four 
independent variables were tested and all were found to be
nonsignificant. The test results for each of the
nonsignificant interaction effects were as follows; Anxiety 
Group X Gender (£[1,124] = 0.18, e  = NS), Anxiety Group X 
Treatment Group (£[1,124] =1.64, E = NS), Gender X
Treatment Group (£[1,124] = 1.42, e  = NS), Anxiety Group X
Repeated Measure (£[1,124] =0.08, E = NS), Gender X
Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 0.18, e  = NS), Treatment Group
X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 1.76, e  = NS), Anxiety Group
X Gender X Treatment Group (£[1,124] = 1.34, e  = NS),
Anxiety Group X Gender X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 1.98, 
E = NS), Anxiety Group X Treatment Group X Repeated Measure 
(£[1,124] = 0.08, e  = NS), Gender X Treatment Group X 
Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 1.60, e  = NS), Anxiety Group X 
Gender X Treatment Group X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] =
2 .23, e  = NS) .
Debriefing Ratings Results
Finally, a third statistical analysis was conducted to 
again test for effects due to demand characteristics 
inherent within the debiasing procedure. Identically to
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the demand ratings analysis, the data collected from the 
six experimental demand stimuli (Appendix E and Appendix F) 
were analyzed as the repeated measure dependent variable. 
However, two debriefing questions (Questions Number 1 and 
3) were used as grouping variables to categorize 
participants according to their perceptions of the purpose 
of the study.
These final statistical procedures can be viewed as 
two additional analyses to investigate the influence of 
demand characteristics upon future probability ratings. 
Instead of using the experimental grouping of the treatment 
manipulation, the debriefing questions were used to 
categorize participants into groups according to their 
perceptions of the purpose of the experiment. Thus, the 
analyses of the demand data was completed in order to 
examine the participant's game-related probability ratings 
as a function of their perception of the purpose of the 
study. This analysis was achieved by collapsing all 
participants within the demand and no demand groups, then 
separating the participants according to their self- 
reported perceived purpose of the study (Debriefing 
Questions 1 and 3).
However, as described earlier it was important to 
justify the separation of participants and verify that 
participants responded to the debriefing questions with
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different perceptions of the purpose of the experiment.
This verification was needed because it was possible that a 
large portion of participants responded to only one of the 
four answers.
A 2 X 4 chi-square analysis was conducted to achieve 
this verification. The proportion of participants from the 
demand and no demand groups were compared for each of the 
four possible responses to the first debriefing question.
No significant difference in the proportion of participants 
was found (chi-square = 0.626, p. = NS). Thus, an 
approximately equal number of participants endorsed each of 
the four possible responses of the first debriefing 
question. This finding justifies the collapsing of 
participants across treatment group and regrouping 
according to their self-reported perception of the purpose 
of the study. The collapsing and regrouping of 
participants is justified because, as explained earlier, an 
approximately equal number of participants was needed in 
each of the four possible groups. Without this equal 
distribution of participants, the debriefing analysis 
results could be inconsequential because a majority of the 
data variability would fall into only one of the perceived 
purpose groups.
- The first analysis used the responses from the first 
debriefing question to group participants into four
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
categories of subjects. Specifically, the four groups 
included participants who perceived the purpose of the 
experiment to (1) increase their probability ratings, (2) 
decrease their probability ratings, (3) make no changes in 
their probability ratings, and (4) those who did not know 
the purpose of the experiment.
The groups were used in a 4 X 2 X 2 X 2  (Four 
Perceived Demand Groups X Repeated Measure X Anxiety X 
Gender) repeated measures analysis of variance. The four 
independent variables and all possible interaction effects 
were tested for statistical significance in the repeated 
measures ANOVA. As stated earlier, it was hypothesized 
that there would be a main effect for anxiety and a two-way 
interaction of gender and anxiety. In addition, it was 
hypothesized that there would be no main effect or 
interaction effects involving the repeated measure.
The results showed a significant main effect for the 
repeated measure (£[1,116] = 5.74, jo < .05). The average 
game-related demand ratings of the post-testing (mean =
4 9.60%, ££. = 12.15) were found to be significantly higher 
than the ratings of the pre-testing (mean = 47.7 4%, ££ = 
10.52). The three remaining main effects were all found to 
be nonsignificant including the main effect for anxiety 
group (£[1,116] = 0.89, £ = NS), gender (£[1,116] = 0.00, p 
= NS), and demand group (£[3,116] = 0.53, p. = NS).
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All interaction effects involving the four independent 
variables were tested and found to be nonsignificant. The 
test results for each of the nonsignificant interaction 
effects were as follows; Anxiety Group X Gender (£[1,116] = 
0.01, p. = NS), Anxiety Group X Demand Group (£[3,116] = 
0.70, p = NS), Gender X Demand Group (£[3,116] = 0.55, p = 
NS), Anxiety Group X Repeated Measure (£[1,116] = 0.62, p = 
NS), Gender X Repeated Measure (£[1,116] = 0.63, p = NS), 
Demand Group X Repeated Measure (£[3,116] = 0.42, p = NS), 
Anxiety Group X Gender X Demand Group (£[3,116] = 2.06, p = 
NS), Anxiety Group X Gender X Repeated Measure (£[1,116] =
0.54, p = N S ) ,  Anxiety Group X Demand Group X Repeated 
Measure (£[3,116] = 1.59, p = NS), Gender X Demand Group X 
Repeated Measure (£[3,116] = 0.42, p = NS) , Anxiety Group X 
Gender X Demand Group X Repeated Measure (£[3,116] = 1.14, 
p = NS).
Finally, the responses from the third debriefing 
question were used in the last repeated measures ANOVA to 
group participants into two categories of subjects. 
Specifically, the two groups included (1) participants who 
noticed a procedure within the experiment which suggested 
the purpose of the experiment was to change their 
probability ratings, and (2) participants who did not 
notice such a procedure.
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The groups were then used i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2  
(Perceived Demand Group X Repeated Measure X Anxiety X 
Gender) repeated measures analysis of variance. The four 
independent variables, and all possible interaction effects 
were tested for statistical significance. It was again 
hypothesized that there would be a main effect for anxiety 
and a two-way interaction of gender and anxiety. In 
addition, it was hypothesized that there would be no main 
effect or interaction effects involving the repeated 
measure.
All four main effects were found to be nonsignificant 
including the main effect for anxiety (£[1,124] = 2.06, p = 
NS), gender (£[1,124] = 0.35, p = NS), demand group 
(Z[lrl24] = 0.41, p. = NS), and repeated measure (£[1,124] = 
2.99, p = NS) . However, the repeated measure main effect 
approached significance.
All interaction effects involving the four independent 
variables were tested and found to be nonsignificant. The 
test results of the nonsignificant interaction effects were 
as follows; Anxiety X Gender (£[1,124] = 0.00, p = NS), 
Anxiety X Demand Group (£[1,124] = 0.05, p = NS), Gender X 
Demand Group (£[1,124] = 1.06, p = NS), Anxiety X Repeated 
Measure (£[1,124] = 0.01, p = NS), Gender X Repeated 
Measure (£[1,124] = 0.10, p = NS), Demand Group X Repeated 
Measure (£[1,124] = 0.24, p = NS), Anxiety X Gender X
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Demand Group (£[1,124] = 0.16, p. = NS), Anxiety X Gender X 
Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 0.47, p = NS), Anxiety X 
Demand Group X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 0.59, p = NS), 
Gender X Demand Group X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 0.12, 
p = NS), Anxiety X Gender X Demand Group X Repeated Measure 
(£[1,124] = 1.76, p = NS).
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Discussion
It was the goal of the current study to investigate 
one debiasing technique, the Consider-An-Alternative 
procedure (Hirt & Markman, 1995), and its ability to reduce 
the judgmental errors which have been shown to be 
associated with higher levels of anxiety (Bentz & 
Williamson, 1998). In addition, a rival hypothesis of 
demand characteristics was examined as a possible 
explanation of any findings of the reduction of judgmental 
errors.
The findings provide support for several conclusions 
involving a judgmental bias associated with anxiety, the 
reduction of the judgmental bias, and the role demand 
characteristics has in the study of the bias. First, the 
pessimistic judgment of future events associated with 
anxiety was replicated (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et 
al., 1999). Second, the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing 
procedure (Hirt & Markman, 1995) was shown to be an 
effective technique in the reduction of the judgmental 
bias. Finally, experimental demand was shown to be 
associated with changes in probability judgments. However, 
demand characteristics could not explain the reduction in 
the judgmental errors.
It is important to note for the purpose of the 
discussion section that equivalent baseline threat and
98
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game-related ratings were needed. Equivalent baseline 
ratings establishes a ratings level from which changes in 
prediction ratings could be demonstrated. Thus, for the 
purpose of experimental control, it was desirable that the 
groups did not differ at baseline. The results showed that 
baseline ratings were equivalent for both the threat and 
game-related ratings. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the initial, pre-testing, levels of threat and game-related 
probability ratings were equivalent, allowing the 
subsequent analysis of changes due to the treatment 
procedure.
Threat Ratines Discussion
In review, the results of the statistical analysis on 
the threat ratings indicated three significant main effects 
for anxiety group, gender, and treatment group. In 
addition, the analysis found one two-way interaction of 
treatment group and repeated measure. It was hypothesized 
that there would be a main effect for anxiety group, a two- 
way interaction of gender and anxiety, and a second two-way 
interaction of treatment group and repeated measure.
First, it was found that highly anxious participants 
rated the likelihood of future negative events more 
pessimistically than participants with a "normal" level of 
anxiety responsivity. As hypothesized, a high level of 
anxiety was found to be associated with higher ratings of
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future threat. This result is consistent with several 
previous studies that have found greater pessimistic 
predictions of future negative events associated with 
higher levels of anxiety (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz 
et al., 1999; Butler & Mathews, 1983; MacLeod & Byrne,
1996). In addition, it supports the conclusion that higher 
levels of anxiety are associated with biased judgments of 
the likelihood of future threat.
Second, it was found that female participants rated 
the likelihood of future negative events more 
pessimistically than male participants. It was 
hypothesized that a two-way interaction of gender and 
anxiety upon threat probability ratings would be found due 
to similar findings in two previous studies (Bentz & 
Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999). However, no such 
interaction was found in the current study.
The previous interaction results of Bentz and 
Williamson (1998) and Bentz et al. (1999) indicated that 
highly anxious women predict the likelihood of future 
threatening events as more probable than male participants 
and female participants with lower levels of anxiety. The 
current results indicated that all female participants, 
regardless of level of anxiety, rated the likelihood of 
future threat as more probable than male participants.
Thus, the change in findings across these studies was due
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to an increase in pessimistic probability -ratings among 
female participants with a lower level of -anxiety in 
comparison to male participants.
This change in results could be explained by 
methodological differences between the stu<iies. 
Specifically, the two previous studies (Bexntz & Williamson, 
1998; Bentz et al., 1999) that found a gender by anxiety 
interaction utilized a multiple regression experimental 
design. In addition, the independent variable, level of 
anxiety, included a wide range of anxiety zresponsivity,
i.e. extreme levels of high and low trait anxiety. It was 
found that as anxiety level increased, the difference 
between the probability ratings of male ancd female 
participants also increased. Thus, it is ILikely that the 
regression design of the two previous studdes found an 
interaction of gender and anxiety because the male and 
female participants with extremely low levels of anxiety 
showed no prediction differences. Furthermore, 
participants who scored more moderately on the measure of 
anxiety made threat probability ratings that showed 
increasing difference between the genders (Bentz & 
Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999).
In the current study, the anxious comparison group was 
designed to be of a more moderate or "normal" level of 
anxiety responsivity. Thus, the anxiety comparison group
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Included male and female group members who were above the 
extremely low level of trait anxiety used in the previous 
two studies. It is possible that this methodological 
difference resulted in the main effect for anxiety due to 
the sufficient gender difference in probability ratings 
among the "normal" anxiety group.
This result is not in direct opposition to the 
findings of Bentz and Williamson (1998) and Bentz et al. 
(1999). However, it does suggest that the previous 
interaction results were primarily due to the inclusion of 
extremely low trait anxious participants in the two 
studies. Thus, it is likely that gender remains a 
moderating variable in the association between anxiety and 
a judgmental cognitive bias. Therefore, as suggested by 
Bentz et al. (1999), it is recommended that gender be
included in future studies investigating this association, 
particularly when the study sample includes participants 
with extremely low levels of anxiety responsivity.
Third, it was found that participants within the 
control group rated the likelihood of future negative 
events as more likely than participants within the 
debiasing group. The average threat probability ratings of 
the control group were significantly higher than the 
average ratings of the debiasing group. However, as 
illustrated in Figure 2 the difference between the
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debiasing and control groups is primarily accounted for by 
the post-testing ratings. Thus, an explanation of the main 
effect for treatment group must be accomplished with the 
following discussion of the two-way interaction involving 
the treatment group and repeated measure independent 
variables.
Finally, a significant two-way interaction of 
treatment group and repeated measure upon threat 
probability ratings was found. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
the threat ratings of the control group showed a positive 
trend with increasing likelihood ratings from pre to post 
testing. Furthermore, the threat ratings of the debiasing 
group showed a negative trend with decreasing likelihood 
ratings from pre to post testing.
Post-hoc analysis of the simple effects within the 
two-way interaction confirmed these trends. The control 
group threat probability ratings significantly increased 
from the pre to the post-testing. The debiasing group 
threat probability ratings were significantly reduced from 
the pre to the post-testing. In addition, the pre-testing 
ratings were equivalent for both the control and debiasing 
groups confirming equal baseline ratings for the threat- 
related analysis. Finally, the post-testing ratings of the 
control group were significantly higher than the debiasing 
group. It is concluded that these findings are generally
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supportive of the effectiveness of the Consider-An- 
Alternative debiasing procedure (Hirt & Markman, 1995) in 
the reduction of judgmental errors.
The main evidence in support of this conclusion is the 
decrease in threat probability ratings of the debiasing 
group from pre to post testing. The Consider-An- 
Alternative debiasing procedure decreased participant 
ratings of the likelihood of future threatening events as 
was expected. The control group did not show a similar 
decrease in likelihood ratings, leading to the conclusion 
that the reduction in ratings was due to the treatment 
procedure.
In addition, the finding of a reduction in threat- 
related probability ratings in the debiasing treatment 
group was equivalent across anxiety level. This finding 
suggests that the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing 
procedure was effective in the reduction of judgmental 
errors regardless of the level of anxiety. Therefore, the 
debiasing procedure may be applicable to the reduction of 
judgmental errors in prediction situations for not only 
highly anxious individuals but also individuals that have a 
more moderate level of anxiety responsivity.
An increase in threat probability ratings of the 
control group was also found and requires further 
discussion. The control group was presented a procedure
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during the treatment phase of the experiment that consisted 
of reading the same stimuli and recording the nouns and 
verbs found within each paragraph. This procedure was 
conducted in order to control for effects due to 
habituation. It is possible that participants within the 
control group actually read each paragraph more than once 
during their recording of the parts of speech. This 
repetition of the negative situations then would have 
resulted in further activation of threat information, 
ultimately leading to increased probability estimates.
This explanation of the increased probability ratings 
in the control group due to the repetition of the stimuli 
is supported by the previous research of Weinstein and 
Klien (1995). As described earlier, the authors 
investigated four debiasing procedures in an attempt to 
reduce health risk judgments. All procedures were 
unsuccessful in reducing the judgmental bias and, more 
importantly, the two procedures that forced participants to 
focus on the health risks actually resulted in an 
exaggerated bias. Thus, Weinstein and Klien (1995) showed 
that the repetition of the health risks information 
increased judgment errors. In the same way, it is possible 
that the control group in the current study may have 
increased the threat probability estimates due to the 
repetition of the negative stimuli. This explanation is
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speculative since there was no way to measure the number of 
times each participant read each scenario.
In summary, several important findings from the threat 
ratings analysis were made. First, the findings offer 
additional evidence that level of anxiety responsivity is 
associated with the biased judgment of future negative 
events (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999;
Butler & Mathews, 1983; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). Second, 
female participants were found to have more pessimistic 
future predictions than male participants. Although an 
interaction of gender and anxiety was hypothesized, it is 
likely that methodological differences between the studies 
can account for this change in results.
Third, it was found that participants within the 
control group rated the likelihood of future negative 
events as more likely than participants within the 
debiasing group. However, this main effect for treatment 
group is primarily accounted for by the two-way interaction 
of treatment group and repeated measure upon threat 
probability ratings. Close examination of the interaction 
effect showed that, as hypothesized, a decrease in 
probability ratings from pre to post testing was found for 
the debiasing group. This finding is supportive of the 
effectiveness of the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing 
procedure (Hirt & Markman, 1995) in the reduction of
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judgmental errors. In addition, it was found that the 
highly anxious and "normal" groups responded equivalently 
to the debiasing intervention. Finally, the two-way 
interaction also showed an increase in threat probability 
ratings of the control group which may be attributable to 
repetition of the negative stimuli resulting in the 
exaggerated judgmental bias.
Demand and Debriefing Ratings Discussion
In review, the statistical analyses involving the 
game-related demand stimuli and the debriefing questions 
included three separate procedures that grouped 
participants according to their perceptions of the purpose 
of the study. In the first and the second procedures, a 
main effect was found for the repeated measure. The game- 
related post-testing probability ratings of the 
participants were found to be significantly higher than the 
pre-testing ratings. All other main effects and 
interaction effects in the three analyses were found to be 
nonsignificant.
It was hypothesized that the three statistical 
procedures would each find a main effect for anxiety, an 
interaction of gender and anxiety, and no main effects or 
interaction effects involving the repeated measure. It was 
the objective of the three analyses to investigate demand 
characteristics as a rival hypothesis to any finding of the
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reduction in judgmental errors associated with the 
debiasing procedure.
The two findings of a main effect for the repeated 
measure confirms that experimental demand was associated 
with increased probability ratings from the pre to the 
post-testing. As will be discussed later, this finding 
supports the conclusion that experimental cues within the 
informed consent or instructions led to the increase in 
probability ratings, not the experimental cues within the 
debiasing procedure.
The three analyses failed to find a main effect for 
anxiety. Stated simply, there was no significant 
difference found between highly anxious and "normal" 
participants on the game-related likelihood ratings. It 
was hypothesized that there would be found a main effect 
for anxiety because previous studies have demonstrated an 
association between anxiety and a prediction bias (Bentz & 
Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999).
One possible explanation for this failure to find a
main effect for anxiety is that the study participants may
have viewed the game-related-events as situations that had
random outcomes or situations in which they had very little 
control over the outcome. As a result, the study 
participants, regardless of their level of anxiety, may 
have made their ratings around 50% and reduced the
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variability of the game-related ratings, a central tendency 
response bias. If the study participants perceived the 
game situations in this way, then it would have been 
possible that no difference in game-related probability 
ratings would have been found between the anxiety groups.
Close examination of the pre and post ratings of both 
the threat-related and the game-related ratings showed an 
overall pattern that supports this conclusion. In general, 
the average game-related ratings were closer to 50% and 
showed lower variability than the threat-related ratings 
suggesting that there may have been a central tendency 
response bias. However, the fact that two main effects 
were found involving the repeated measure suggests that 
decreased variability of the dependent variable was not the 
cause of this null finding.
In hindsight, it would have been helpful to include a 
third phase to the pilot study to verify the game-related 
stimuli as an adequate measure for the comparison of demand 
characteristics. For example, a small experiment could 
have been conducted using undergraduate students randomly 
assigned to a demand group and a no demand group in a 
similar repeated measure pre-post experimental design. The 
demand group would have completed the game-related stimuli 
as a pre-testing. Then, the demand group participants 
would have received some instructions informing them that
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the purpose of the experiment was to influence them to make 
their ratings as low as possible. The demand group would 
then have received the same game-related stimuli again as a 
post-testing.
The no demand group would also have completed the 
game-related stimuli as a pre-testing. However, this group 
would then have received some distractor task that 
approximated the time that it took the demand group to 
receive their instructions. The no demand group would then 
have received the game-related stimuli again as a post­
testing. These data would have been analyzed in a 2 X 2 
repeated measures ANOVA.
If the game-related stimuli were perceived by all the 
participants as events in which they had very little 
control, thus leading to a central tendency response bias, 
then the analysis would find no main effects or interaction 
effects involving the two independent variables. If, on 
the other hand, the game-related stimuli were an adequate 
measure of the experimental demand, then the analysis would 
find an interaction of the repeated measure and the demand 
group. A pilot study such as this would have clearly 
established the game—related stimuli as an adequate measure 
to allow the comparison of experimental demand.
A second possible explanation for the failure to find 
a main effect for anxiety is the content specificity
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hypothesis. Specifically, the theory as originally 
described by Beck and Emory (1985) proposes that emotional 
problems of an individual determine the content of the 
information processing errors that are most common for that 
individual. Therefore, since the game-related prediction 
stimuli have very little similarity in content to the 
threat—related information processing errors associated 
with anxiety, a main effect for anxiety would not be found. 
Stated simply, it is possible that the highly anxious 
participants had no judgmental bias when completing the 
game-related predictions because the content of the stimuli 
did not activate the error.
Prior research on the content specificity of a 
judgmental bias associated with anxiety is sparse. In the 
only study that directly investigated the phenomena, Bentz 
et al. (1999) presented findings that were generally 
supportive of the content specificity of judgmental errors 
associated with anxiety. Therefore, it is concluded that 
the most likely explanation of the failure to find a main 
effect for anxiety in the demand analyses is the content 
specificity of the stimuli. This conclusion is justified 
by two reasons. First, the previous research of Bentz et 
al. (1999) supports the content specificity explanation. 
Second, the fact that enough variability within the 
experimental demand dependent variable was present to find
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the two main effects for the repeated measure makes a 
central tendency response bias explanation unlikely.
Neither of the two debriefing analyses found, as was 
hypothesized, an interaction of gender and anxiety upon 
game-related likelihood ratings. Again, the same two 
possible explanations for the null findings can be stated. 
Specifically, as described earlier the lack of an 
interaction of gender and anxiety can possibly be 
attributed to either (1) a central tendency response bias 
or (2) the content specificity hypothesis. However, it is 
again suggested that the content specificity explanation is 
the most probable.
In summary, two important findings and conclusions 
from the demand and debriefing ratings analyses can be 
reviewed. First, it can be concluded that the game-related 
ratings were influenced by experimental demand. However, 
it is important to note for the purpose of later discussion 
that this association was in the positive direction with an 
increase in demand ratings from pre to post-testing.
Second, no main effect for anxiety group or interaction of 
gender and anxiety were found. Two possible explanations 
were proposed which included (1) a central tendency 
response bias and (2) the content specificity hypothesis.
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General Discussion
It was the goal of the current study to investigate 
one debiasing technique, the Consider-An-Alternative 
procedure (Hirt & Markman, 1995), and its ability to reduce 
the judgmental errors which have been shown to be 
associated with higher levels of anxiety (Bentz & 
Williamson, 1998). In addition, a rival hypothesis of 
demand characteristics was examined as a possible 
explanation of any findings of the reduction of judgmental 
errors.
The results of the analyses for the study indicated 
several general conclusions. First, the presence of a 
judgmental bias associated with anxiety was found. This 
finding supports previous studies that have shown similar 
results (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999; 
Butler & Mathews, 1983; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996) . However, 
the importance of this initial finding must be emphasized.
The demonstration of the judgmental bias associated 
with anxiety was essential to the subsequent interpretation 
of all results. If no bias was found, then the evaluation 
of the debiasing treatment and the demand characteristics 
rival hypothesis would have been impossible. Stated 
simply, if there was no bias then there would be nothing to 
debias. Fortunately, the bias was found supporting 
previous studies, and allowing the evaluation of the
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debiasing procedure and the demand characteristics rival 
hypothesis.
Second, the debiasing of the judgmental errors 
associated with anxiety was demonstrated. A reduction in 
threat-related probability ratings of the treatment group 
that received the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing 
procedure was shown. It was concluded that this reduction 
in ratings was due to the treatment procedure, namely the 
generation of positive alternative outcomes. Furthermore, 
the reduction in threat ratings was equivalent for highly 
anxious and "normal" participants. Finally, the reduction 
of threat ratings in the debiasing group corresponded with 
an opposite trend for the control group, an increase in 
threat-related probability ratings. As described earlier, 
it is possible that this increase in probability ratings 
was due to the repetition of stimuli in the control 
procedure.
Thus, taken together the effectiveness o'f the 
debiasing procedure appeared to result in two possibly 
important developments. First, it is possible that when 
individuals are confronted with threatening situations that 
require predictions, the process of considering positive 
alternative outcomes may lead to more positive thinking. 
Second, the same prediction situation may also lead to less
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negative and/or less ruminative thinking and prevent an 
exaggeration of judgmental errors.
The primary focus of the current study was to 
demonstrate the debiasing of judgmental errors. However, 
the specific process by which the debiasing occurred 
remains unclear. In the introduction, an availability 
heuristic explanation was presented in which the activation 
of alternative information led to decreased threat 
probability ratings. This explanation continues to be 
advocated as the most likely interpretation of the data.
In addition, this explanation is supported by the similar 
proposals of Hirt and Markman (1995) and of Muirana and 
Wilson (1995).
Finally, an availability heuristic explanation fits 
well with the increase in threat probability ratings 
observed in the control group. Specifically, the 
repetition of the stimuli may have increased the 
accessibility of threat information, ultimately leading to 
increased probability estimates in the control group.
Thus, if availability is in fact the driving mechanism of 
debiasing, then the findings suggest that the Consider-An- 
Alternative technique may not only reduce judgmental errors 
but also may prevent exaggerated errors that would occur 
with the increased accessibility of information.
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It is acknowledged that the exact mechanisms by which 
the debiasing may occur remains to be determined. For 
example, one possible alternative explanation of the 
debiasing effect pertains to the participants' level of 
motivation. Specifically, the Consider-An-Alternative task 
may have increased the motivation of participants by 
maintaining a search for alternatives, a search that was 
not required of the control group participants. The result 
then may have been lower judgments on the part of the 
debiasing group due to increased effort as opposed to 
accessibility of information.
A second possible alternative explanation of the 
debiasing effect is demand characteristics. Specifically, 
it could be argued that, due to the obvious nature of the 
task, experimental cues within the informed consent, 
instructions, and debiasing procedure resulted in the 
participants reducing their ratings to comply with the 
perceived purpose of the study. This rival hypothesis was 
directly addressed with the addition of the six game- 
related experimental demand stimuli and the debriefing 
questions.
Experimental demand was found to be associated with an 
increase in probability ratings from pre to post-testing. 
This increase in ratings was found across all participants, 
regardless of treatment group, gender, or anxiety level.
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Thus, it is likely that the experimental cues within the 
informed consent and instructions lead to the increase in 
probability ratings, not the experimental cues within the 
debiasing procedure. This conclusion can be made because 
no difference in game-related probability ratings was 
observed between the two treatment groups (control and 
debiasing).
As a result, demand characteristics cannot account for 
the reduction in threat-related probability ratings of the 
debiasing group. The finding of an interaction of 
treatment group and repeated measure upon threat-related 
predictions led to the conclusion that the debiasing 
procedure was effective in the reduction of judgmental 
errors. It was proposed that this debiasing effect was 
likely due to an availability mechanism. Demand 
characteristics as a rival hypothesis to this proposal has 
been effectively ruled out.
However, demand characteristics were shown to be 
associated with an increase in likelihood ratings. 
Experimental demand, therefore, continues to be a possible 
confound in future research especially when a similar 
methodology is employed. It is recommended that future 
experiments pay particular attention to experimental demand 
within the informed consent, experimental instructions, and 
stimuli to minimize the cues to the study's purpose.
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Thus, anxiety was found to be associated with the 
biased judgment of future threatening events. Women were 
found to make higher threat-related predictions in 
comparison to men. The Consider-An-Alternative debiasing 
procedure was found to be an effective technique in the 
reduction of the judgment bias, regardless of level of 
anxiety. Finally, the reduction in judgmental errors 
cannot be explained by demand characteristics.
The findings from the current study have their largest 
potential impact in the area of techniques of cognitive— 
behavior therapy. Future research should extend this 
debiasing procedure to clinical populations and 
psychotherapy treatment outcome studies. It is possible 
that, given continued research interest and favorable 
results, future cognitive-behavioral treatment approaches 
for anxiety may include training in the consideration of 
alternative outcomes.
This study had certain limitations and the findings 
should be interpreted within the context of these 
limitations. First, this study used an analog sample of 
undergraduate students which restricts the generalization 
of these findings to clinical populations. Future studies 
should investigate the judgmental bias and the debiasing of 
judgmental errors associated with clinical levels of 
anxiety. Second, this study used a self-report methodology
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which has also been utilized in several previous studies 
(Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999; Butler & 
Mathews, 1983; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). It is recommended 
that future studies use a different method of measurement 
of the judgmental bias. For example, the measurement of 
actual behavior, such as avoidance, after likelihood 
judgments are made by the participants. Third, the 
participants of this study were not followed over time to 
investigate if the reduction in judgmental bias was 
maintained. It would be desirable for future studies to 
evaluate the reproducibility and stability of the debiasing 
effect.
Finally, demand specificity, the possible differential 
effects that experimental demand may have on threat versus 
game-related ratings, was not examined. For example, 
differential effects that the experimental cues within the 
treatment procedure may have had on the threat and game- 
related ratings was not investigated. It is possible that 
the experimental cues caused an increase in probability 
ratings on only the game-related ratings while having no 
influence on the threat-related ratings. This differential 
specificity of experimental cues to only the demand items 
would then have an outcome identical to the present 
findings. However, the results would have been due to the 
unique effect that experimental demand had on the game-
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related ratings because of demand specificity. It is 
recommended that future studies employing a similar 
methodology clearly establish that differential effects of 
experimental demand on judgment ratings has been minimized.
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Appendix A: Pre-Testing Experimental Stimuli
Directions; Please read the following paragraphs and 
imagine yourself in that situation. Then, rate the 
probability that the event listed will happen to you on the 
following scale, given the situation that you read. You 
may use any numeric value between 0% and 100%.
I----|---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- (---- [
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0% = The outcome has no chance of occurring.
50% = The outcome has an equal chance of occurring or not 
occurring.
100% = The outcome will definitely occur.
Please mark only a line to indicate your rating of the 
probability that the event will occur, given the situation 
that was presented. You may draw your line at any point on 
the scale provided. DO NOT WRITE A NUMBER
Example: Your car's engine has not been running very well 
over the last month and it has been very hard to start at 
times, but you have been unable to take it to a mechanic to 
have it checked.
What is the probability that your car will break down 
today?
0%- 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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1. It has been raining very hard and windy all day and 
there has been a flood and tornado advisory reported on the 
news. Your home is built in a low area with a history of 
water and wind damage in the past.
What is the probability that your home will sustain damage 
from the storm?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. You are in a large auditorium with very few other 
people watching a movie. At the end of the movie, people 
begin to move toward the exits.
What is the probability that you will be injured trying to 
leave the auditorium?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. You are passing one of your classes but it is early in 
the semester. There are several more tests remaining for 
your grade to change.
What is the probability that you will fail the class?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. Late at night, you are walking to your car in a part 
of town that is known for a high crime rate. Your car is 
parked in an area that has very poor lighting.
What is the probability that you will be mugged?
I---- |---|----|--- |----|--- |----|--- (--- |----|
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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5. It has been a sunny day with very few clouds in the 
sky. You live in a home that has never had a history of 
water or wind damage from a storm.
What is the probability that your home will avoid damage 
from the storm?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. Late at night, you are driving on a highway that is 
totally deserted. One of your tires blows out and you pull 
off the road to check for damage.
What is the probability that you will be stranded on the 
highway?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. You have just graduated from college and taken a job 
that will move you away from your home town. This job will 
take you to a city with a low crime rate and you will be 
living in an safe part of the town.
What is the probability that you will avoid becoming a 
crime victim?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. You have a job that you enjoy but the company is 
having financial problems and will lay off several 
employees in the near future.
What is the probability that you will keep your job?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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9. You are riding a bicycle down a large hill when you 
realize that the brakes of the bike are not working and a 
sharp turn is just ahead.
What is the probability that you will avoid wrecking the 
bicycle?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. You are driving to a meeting across town, but you 
don't expect to be late. The weather is fine and traffic 
is average.
What is the probability that you will be in a car accident?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
11. You have just graduated from college and taken a job 
that will move you away from your home town. This job will 
take you to a city with a high crime rate and you will be 
living in an unsafe part of the town.
What is the probability that you will become a crime 
victim?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
12. You have a job that you enjoy and the company is 
financially having no problems. There is little risk that 
the company will lay off any employees in the near future.
What is the probability that you will lose your job?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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13. During the day, you are walking to your car in a part 
of town that is familiar to you. Your car is parked in an 
area that often has others around, but at this time you do 
not see anyone.
What is the probability that you will avoid being mugged?
1 I I I I I t I I I I
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
14. During the day, you are driving on a highway that has 
few other cars. You know that one of your tires has a slow 
air leak, but you checked the air pressure in the morning.
What is the probability that you will avoid being stranded 
on the highway?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
15. You are failing one of your classes and it is already 
half way through the semester. There are only two tests 
remaining to pull your grade up to a passing level.
What is the probability that you will pass the class?
I---- |-- |----|----,--- |--- |----,----|----|----|
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
16. You are in a large auditorium with hundreds of people 
watching a movie. You have a faint smell of smoke when an 
alarm goes off and people begin running to the exits.
What is the probability that you will avoid being injured 
trying to leave the auditorium?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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17. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some 
friends when a large storm begins to roll in. You try to 
start the engine, but mechanical problems prevent the 
engine from starting.
What is the probability that you will be lost at sea?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
18. You are late for an important meeting across town so 
you are driving above the speed limit. It starts to rain 
heavily and the traffic around you is hard to see clearly.
What is the probability that you will avoid a car accident?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
19. You are riding a bicycle on a relatively flat road 
with no other cars or bicycles in sight. The brakes of 
your bike are working just fine.
What is the probability that you will wreck the bicycle?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
20. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some 
friends and it is sunny with few clouds in the sky. Your 
boat has never had any mechanical problems.
What is the probability that you will get home safe?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Appendix B: Post-Testing Experimental Stimuli
Directions: Please read the following paragraphs and 
imagine yourself in that situation. Then, rate the 
probability that the event listed will happen to you on the 
following scale, given the situation that you read. You 
may use any numeric value between 0% and 100%.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0% = The outcome has no chance of occurring.
5 0% = The outcome has an equal chance of occurring or not 
occurring.
100% = The outcome will definitely occur.
Please mark only a line to indicate your rating of the 
probability that the event will occur, given the situation 
that was presented. You may draw your line at any point on 
the scale provided. DO NOT WRXTE A NUMBER
Example; Your car's engine has not been running very well 
over the last month and it has been very hard to start at 
times, but you have been unable to take it to a mechanic to 
have it checked.
What is the probability that your car will break down 
today?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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1. You are driving to a meeting across town, but you 
don't expect to be late. The weather is fine and traffic 
is average.
What is the probability that you will avoid being in a car 
accident?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. You are riding a bicycle down a large hill when you 
realize that the brakes of the bike are not working and a 
sharp turn is just ahead.
What is the probability that you will wreck the bicycle?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% - 90% 100%
3. During the day, you are driving on a highway that has 
few other cars. You know that one of your tires has a slow 
air leak, but you cheeked the air pressure in the morning.
What is the probability that you will be stranded on the 
highway?
[-----|---|----|---- |----|----|----,----|----,---- j
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. You are in a large auditorium with hundreds of people 
watching a movie. You have a faint smell of smoke when an 
alarm goes off and people begin running to the exits.
What is the probability that you will be injured trying to 
leave the auditorium?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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5. You have a j ob that you enj oy but the company is 
having financial problems and will lay off several 
employees in the near future.
What is the probability that you will lose your job?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some 
friends when a large storm begins to roll in. You try to 
start the engine, but mechanical problems prevent the 
engine from starting.
What is the probability that you will get home safe?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7. You have a job that you enjoy and the company is 
financially having no problems. There is little risk, that 
the company will lay off any employees in the near future.
What is the probability that you will keep your job?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8. Late at night, you are driving on a highway that is 
totally deserted. One of your tires blows out and you pull 
off the road to check for damage.
What is the probability that you will avoid being stranded 
on the highway?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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9. You are riding a bicycle on a relatively flat road 
with no other cars or bicycles in sight. The brakes of 
your bike are working just fine.
What is the probability that you will avoid wrecking the 
bicycle?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some 
friends and it is sunny with few clouds in the sky. Your 
boat has never had any mechanical problems.
What is the probability that you will be lost at sea?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
11. You are failing one of your classes and it is already 
half way through the semester. There are only two tests 
remaining to pull your grade up to a passing level.
What is the probability that you will fail the class?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
12. During the day, you are walking to your car in a part 
of town that is familiar to you. Your car is parked in an 
area that often has others around, but at this time you do 
not see anyone.
What is the probability that you will be mugged?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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13. It has been raining very hard and windy all day and 
there has been a flood and tornado advisory reported on the 
news. Your home is built in a low area with a history of 
water and wind damage in the past.
What is the probability that your home will avoid 
sustaining damage from the storm?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
14. You have just graduated from college and taken a job 
that will move you away from your home town. This job will 
take you to a city with a low crime rate and you will be 
living in an safe part of the town.
What is the probability that you will be a crime victim?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
15. You are late for an important meeting across town so 
you are driving above the speed limit. It starts to rain 
heavily and the traffic around you is hard to see clearly.
What is the probability that you will be in a car accident?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
16. Late at night, you are walking to your car in a part 
of town that is known for a high crime rate. Your car is 
parked in an area that has very poor lighting.
What is the probability that you will avoid being mugged?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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17. You have just graduated from college and taken a job 
that will move you away from your home town. This job will 
take you to a city with a high crime rate and you will be 
living in an unsafe part of the town.
What is the probability that you will avoid becoming a 
crime victim?
I--- |--- ,--- |--- \----|--- !----|--- |--- |----|
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
18 . It has been a sunny day with very few clouds in the 
sky. You live in a home that has never had a history of 
water or wind damage from a storm.
What is the probability that your home will sustain damage 
from the storm?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
19. You are passing one of your classes but it is early in 
the semester. There are several more tests remaining for 
your grade to change.
What is the probability that you will pass the class?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
20. You are in a large auditorium with very few other 
people watching a movie. At the end of the movie, people 
begin to move toward the exits.
What is the probability that you will avoid being injured 
trying to leave the auditorium?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Appendix C: Consider-An-Alternative Debiasing Stimuli
Directions: Please read the following paragraphs and 
imagine yourself in that situation. Then, generate three 
possible ways in which the situation may end in a POSITIVE 
outcome. Give enough detail to your situational outcome to 
clearly explain how the event will end. Your three 
alternative outcomes for the situation should all be 
different and POSITIVE in some way.
Example: Your car's engine has not been running very well 
over the last month and it has been very hard to start at 
times, but you have been unable to take it to a mechanic to 
have it checked.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2)  
(3)___________________________________________________________
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1. You are riding a bicycle on a relatively flat road 
with no other cars or bicycles in sight. The brakes of 
your bike are working just fine.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2 )  
(3) __________________________________________________________
2. It has been raining very hard and windy all day and 
there has been a flood and tornado advisory reported on the 
news. Your home is built in a low area with a history of 
water and wind damage in the past.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2 )  
(3) __________________________________________________________
3. You have just graduated from college and taken a job 
that will move you away from your home. This job will take 
you to a city with a high crime rate and you will be living 
in an unsafe part of the town.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2)  
(3)  __________________________
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4. During the day, you are walking to your car in a part 
of town that is familiar to you. Your car is parked in an 
area that often has others around, but at this time you do 
not see anyone.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1) ______________________________________________________________________
(2 ) _________________________________________________________________________
(3)  
5. You are riding a bicycle down a large hill when you 
realize that the brakes of the bike are not working and a 
sharp turn is just ahead.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2 )  
(3)  
6. You are in a large auditorium with hundreds of people 
watching a movie. You have a faint smell of smoke when an 
alarm goes off and people begin running to the exits.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1 )  
(2 )  
( 3 ) _____________________________________________________
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7. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some 
friends and it is sunny with few clouds in the sky. Your 
boat has never had any mechanical problems.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2)  
(3)  
8. During the day, you are driving on a highway that has 
few other cars. You know that one of your tires has a slow 
air leak, but you checked the air pressure in the morning.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2 )  
(3)  
9. Late at night, you are driving on a highway that is 
totally deserted. One of your tires blows out and you pull 
off the road to check for damage.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2 )  
(3)  ______
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10. You have a job that you enjoy but the company is 
having financial problems and will lay off several 
employees in the near future.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2)  
(3)  
11. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some 
friends when a large storm begins to roll in. You try to 
start the engine, but mechanical problems prevent the 
engine from starting.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1) ______________________________________________________________________
(2)  
(3)  
12. You have just graduated from college and taken a job 
that will move you away from your home town. This job will 
take you to a city with a low crime rate and you will be 
living in an safe part of the town.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1) ______________________________________________________________________
(2 )  
(3)  
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13. You are passing one of your classes but it is early in
the semester. There are several more tests remaining for
your grade to change.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2 )  
(3) ___________________________________________________________
14. You are failing one of your classes and it is already
half way through the semester. There are only two tests
remaining to pull your grade up to a passing level.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2 )  
(3) ________________________________________________________
15. It has been a sunny day with very few clouds in the 
sky. You live in a home that has never had a_history of 
water or wind damage from a storm.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2 )  
(3)  _______  ______________________________
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16. Late at night, you are walking to your car in a part 
of town that is known for a high crime rate. Your car is 
parked in an area that has very poor lighting.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1) _______________________________________________________________________
(2) ___________________________________________________________________
(3)  
17. You have a job that you enjoy and the company is 
financially having no problems. There is little risk that 
the company will lay off any employees in the near future.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1 )  
(2 )  
(3)  
18. You are late for an important meeting across town so 
you are driving above the speed limit. It starts to rain 
heavily and the traffic around you is hard to see clearly.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1)  
(2 )  
(3)   ____________________________________________________
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19. You are in a large auditorium with very few other 
people watching a movie. At the end of the movie, people 
begin to move toward the exits.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1) ___________________________________________________________________
(2 )  
(3)  
20. You are driving to a meeting across town, but you 
don't expect to be late. The weather is fine and traffic 
is average.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this 
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )  
(3)_________________________ 
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Appendix D: Control Stimuli
Directions: Please read the following paragraphs and 
imagine yourself in that situation. Then, please indicate 
the nouns and verbs within the paragraphs by writing the 
words in the spaces provided below. There may be more or 
less of the parts of speech present within the paragraphs 
in comparison to spaces provided. However, you need to 
only indicate a total of three nouns and verbs in the 
spaces provided.
Example: Your car's engine has not been running very well
over the last month and it has been very hard to start at 
times, but you have been unable to take it to a mechanic to 
have it checked.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1)
(2)   (2)
(3)   (3)
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1. You are riding a bicycle on a relatively flat road 
with no other cars or bicycles in sight. The brakes of 
your bike are working just fine.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1) (1)
(2 )   (2 )
(3)   (3)
2. It has been raining very hard and windy all day and 
there has been a flood and tornado advisory reported on the 
news. Your home is built in a low area with a history of 
water and wind damage in the past.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2 )   (2 )
(3)   (3)
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3. You have just graduated from college and taken a job 
that will move you away from your home. This job will take 
you to a city with a high crime rate and you will be living 
in an unsafe part of the town.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
NQ.uns Verbs
(1 )   (1) __________________
(2 )   (2 ) ____________________
(3)   (3) _________________
4. During the day, you are walking to your car in a part 
of town that is familiar to you. Your car is parked in an 
area that often has others around, but at this time you do 
not see anyone.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
NQUns Verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2) _
(3)   (3)
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5. You are riding a bicycle down a large hill when you 
realize that the brakes of the bike are not working and a 
sharp turn is just ahead.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2 )
(3)   (3)
6. You are in a large auditorium with hundreds of people 
watching a movie. You have a faint smell of smoke when an 
alarm goes off and people begin running to the exits.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns verbs
(1) (1)
(2 ) (2]
(3) (3)
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7. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some 
friends and it is sunny with few clouds in the sky. Your 
boat has never had any mechanical problems.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verfaa
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2) _
(3)   (3)
8. During the day, you are driving on a highway that has 
few other cars. You know that one of your tires has a slow 
air leak, but you checked the air pressure in the morning.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2) _
(3)   (3)
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9. Late at night, you are driving on a highway that is 
totally deserted. One of your tires blows out and you pull 
off the road to check for damage.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns V.sxk£
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2 ) _
(3)   (3)
10. You have a job that you enjoy but the company is 
having financial problems and will lay off several 
employees in the near future.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2 ) _
(3)   (3)
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11. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some 
friends when a large storm begins to roll in. You try to 
start the engine, but mechanical problems prevent the 
engine from starting.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1) (1)
(2 )   (2)
(3)     (3)
12. You have just graduated from college and taken a job 
that will move you away from your home town. This job will 
take you to a city with a low crime rate and you will be 
living in an safe part of the town.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1)
(2 ) (2 )
(3) (3)
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13. You are passing one of your classes but it is early in 
the semester. There are several more tests remaining for 
your grade to change.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2 ) _
(3)   (3)
14. You are failing one of your classes and it is already 
half way through the semester. There are only two tests 
remaining to pull your grade up to a passing level.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1)
(2 )   (2 )
(3) (3)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 5 6
15. It has been a sunny day with very few clouds in the 
sky. You live in a home that has never had a history of 
water or wind damage from a storm.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2) _
(3)   (3)
16. Late at night, you are walking to your car in a part 
of town that is known for a high crime rate. Your car is 
parked in an area that has very poor lighting.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1) (1)
(2 )   (2)
(3) (3)
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17. You have a j ob that you enj oy and the company is 
financially having no problems. There is little risk that 
the company will lay off any employees in the near future.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2) _
(3)   (3)
18. You are late for an important meeting across town so 
you are driving above the speed limit. It starts to rain 
heavily and the traffic around you is hard to see clearly.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
NO.UPS Verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2)   (2 ) _
(3)   (3)
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19. You are in a large auditorium with very few other 
people watching a movie. At the end of the movie, peojple 
begin to move toward the exits.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragrapch 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns Verbs
(1) (1)
(2 ) (2)
(3) (3)
20. You are driving to a meeting across town, but you 
don't expect to be late. The weather is fine and trafffic 
is average.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragrapoh 
above by writing the words in the spaces provided belowr.
Nouns Verbs
(1)   (1) _
(2 ) (2 )
(3)   (3)
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Appendix E : Pre-Testing Experimental Demand Stimuli
1. You are playing on a softball team that is sponsored 
by your job. You have a record of 3 wins and 3 losses, and 
today you are playing an opposing team with a similar 
record.
What is the probability that your team will win the game?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. You are playing a game of volleyball at a summer 
picnic with a group of friends.
What is the probability that your team will win the game?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. You are playing a game of Monolopy at a holiday party 
with your family and friends.
What is the probability that you will win the game?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. You are playing a game of cards at your weekly poker 
match with a group of six poker players.
What is the probability that you will lose the game?
,----- |--- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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5. While at the park, you get picked to play some 
basketball on an outside court with some people that you do 
not know.
What is the probability that your team will lose the game?
I --------| ---------| --------| -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | ---------|
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. You are at a friend's house playing a game of Trivial 
Pursuit. There are a total of six people playing the game,
What is the probability that you will lose the game?
I ------- | -------- | ------- | -------- | -------- , -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- , -------- |
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Appendix F: Post-Testing Experimental Demand Stimuli
1. You are playing on a softball team that is sponsored 
by your job. You have a record of 3 wins and 3 losses, and 
today you are playing an opposing team with a similar 
record.
What is the probability that your team will lose the game?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. You are playing a game of volleyball at a summer 
picnic with a group of friends.
What is the probability that your team will lose the game?
I--1-- ,--|-- |-- ,-- |-- |-- |-- 1-- 1
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3. You are playing a game of Monolopy at a holiday party 
with your family and friends.
What is the probability that you will lose the game?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4. You are playing a game of cards at your weekly poker 
match with a group of six poker players.
What is the probability that you will win the game?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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5. While at the park, you get picked to play some 
basketball on an outside court with some people that you do 
not know.
What is the probability that your team will win the game?
I----|---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. You are at a friend's house playing a game of Trivial 
Pursuit. There are a total of six people playing the game,
What is the probability that you will win the game?
I----|---- |---- |---- |---- |----|---- |---- |---- |---- [
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Appendix G: Debriefing Questions
Directions: Please read the following three questions
and circle the answer that most closely 
describes your opinion.
1. In your opinion, what was the purpose of the 
experiment ?
A. The purpose of the experiment was for me to 
increase my probability ratings of the likelihood 
of future events.
B. The purpose of the experiment was for me to 
decrease my probability ratings of the likelihood 
of future events.
C. The purpose of the experiment was for me to make 
no changes in my probability ratings of the 
likelihood of future events.
D. I don't know the purpose of the experiment.
2. In your opinion, was there any part of the experiment 
that suggested to you that you should change your 
outcome probability ratings? If so, which part of the 
experiment gave you this suggestion to change your 
probability ratings?
A. The part which asked me to write several
alternative outcomes to the situations.
B. The part which asked me to identify the nouns and
verbs in the written situations.
C. The part which asked me to make the outcome
probability ratings for a second time.
D. There was no part of the experiment that
suggested to me that I should change my outcome
probability ratings.
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3. Did you notice a procedure within the experiment which 
suggested to you that the purpose of the experiment 
was to change your probability ratings because you 
were considering alternative ways that the situations 
may end?
A. Yes
B. No
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Appendix H: Informed Consent
1. Study Title:
2. Performance Site:
3. Investigator:
4 .
The Debiasing of Judgmental Errors 
Associated with Anxiety
Texas Wesleyan University
The following investigator is 
available for questions about this 
study, M-F, 8:00 am - 5:00 pm.
Bret G. Bentz M.A., (817) 732-4231
Purpose of the Study: The purpose of the study to
investigate the prediction of 
future events and errors that may 
occur in these predictions. The 
study will investigate several 
questions concerning the reduction 
of judgmental errors that occur in 
differing levels of anxiety.
5. Subject Inclusion:
6. Number of Subjects:
7. Study Procedures:
There are no inclusion or 
exclusion criteria for 
participation in this study. All 
students recruited through the 
Department of Psychology will be 
able to participate.
400
The study will include the 
completion of several 
questionnaires and will take 
approximately 45 minutes. First, 
you will be asked to complete a 
short demographic information 
sheet and a questionnaire designed 
to assess you current level of 
anxiety. Next, you will read 
several hypothetical situations 
and make ratings as to the 
probability of certain outcomes. 
Next, depending on your randomized 
group, you will again read several 
similar hypothetical situations
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8. Benefits:
9. Risks:
10. Right to Refuse:
11. Privacy:
and either record the parts of 
speech in the paragraph or 
generate alternative outcomes. 
Finally, you will read several 
situations and make probability 
ratings a second time followed by 
several debriefing questions.
The benefits for your 
participation in this study is the 
advancement of the understanding 
of judgmental errors associated 
with anxiety.
There are no potential risks for 
physical or social harm for your 
participation. Psychological risk 
is minimal and only includes the 
inadvertent release of sensitive 
information found in the second 
questionnaire. Every effort will 
be made to maintain the 
confidentiality of your study 
records. Data will be kept in 
secure locations to which only the 
investigator has access.
Subjects may choose not to 
participate or to withdraw from 
the study at any time without 
penalty or loss of any benefit to 
which you are entitled.
The results of the study may be 
published, but no names or 
identifying information will be 
included in the publication. 
Subject identity will remain 
confidential unless disclosure is 
required by law.
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12. Signatures:
The study has been discussed with me and all my 
questions have been answered. I may direct additional 
questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. 
If I have questions about subjects' rights or other 
concerns, I can contact Charles E. Graham, Chairman, LSU 
Institutional Review Board, (225) 388-1492. I agree to 
participate in the study described above and acknowledge 
the researchers' obligation to provide me with a copy of 
this consent form.
Participant's Signature Date
Participant's Name (Please Print)
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degree of Doctor of Philosophy in clinical psychology at 
Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He 
is originally from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he 
received the degree of Bachelor of Science in psychology 
from Carnegie-Mellon University. After his undergraduate 
education, Dr. Bentz spent two years working at the Western 
Psychiatric Institute and Clinic at the University of 
Pittsburgh before leaving for his graduate studies at 
Louisiana State University. In addition, he completed his 
clinical psychology internship at the University of North 
Texas Health Sciences Center in Fort Worth, Texas. He will 
be starting on January 1, 2001, a one year post-doctoral 
fellowship at the University of North Texas Health Sciences 
Center in Fort Worth, Texas.
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